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In summing up at tho oonclusion of this long and

profoundly important trials the prosecution is anxious
to observe the utmost economy of -vfords and means.

The

burdens -which this trial has imposed, on the Tribunal

and on counsel for the prosecution and defense alike,

have been heavy.

The record of the testimony is leng

thy, and tho documentary exhibits are voluminous j the
analysis of the entire record is a formidable under

taking, On the part of the prosecution, we intend to
embody our detailed analysis of the record, and our
summation of the evidence as it relates to each in

dividual defendant, in the briefs which we will file.

It is our plan to file briefs with respect to each de
fendant covering the charges under Counts Two and
Three of the indictment. We also plan to file an

over-all brief under Count One of the indictment,
s-nd in this brief to include a summation of the evi

dence under Count One relating to each defendant.

In this oral summation, accordir^ly, we do not

propose to deal exhaustively with each ctergo of the
indiotment nor mth each defendant. To undertake a

full and detailed exposition of this sort would, we

thirilc, prolong this statement unneoessariay and need

lessly duplicate much of what will appear in our

triefs. Today we propose only to deal, as compactly
possible, with some of the more salient features

Of this trial and to endeavor to achieve a synthesis

-nd emphasis which will be helpf.1 to the Tribunal
in striking a final balanoo,

Sevei^l defenses v/hich have been urged in this
case are comuon to all, or nearly all, of the trials^
whioh have been held in Hurriberg. For the most part.
* 1

••

these defenses have been argued on numerous occasions
✓

by both prosecution and defense^ and h&ve been deter»
mined and re-determined in a succession of judgments*

Y/ith those defenses, T/a do not propose to deal at

length again on this occasion.

For example, counsel

for the defendant Leeb, in his opening statement,
challenged the entire concept of the crime against

peace as invalid on the basis that it is ^ post

facto law.^ As to this argument, the prosecution
finds itself quite unable and, indeed, feels it quite-

unnecessary, to add anything to v/hat it has urged on
numerous prior occasions or to vrhat has been set forth
in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal
and the judgments of IMlitary Tribunals III and VI in

the Farben case (Case No, 6) and the Krupp case (Case
No, 10),

Likewise, it has been repeatedly suggested

that the so-called defense of "superior orders" is a
complete bar to the prosecution of these defendants.

This argument, too, has been extensively briefed and
argued in all the previous Nurnberg trials, and has
been discussed and rejected in the judgments.

We

will have considerable to say concerning the extent

to vfhioh this plea should be given weight by way of

mitigation, but vfe do not propose to deal virith it
again as a defense.

On such matters, we will con

tent ourselves by submitting appendices to the

Cooirt containing references to or quotations from
the relevant portions of previous judgments and
arguments.

1,

Opening Statement of Dr, Hans I^ternser, p, 30^

^
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CRB5ES AC5A.INST lEA-CE:

COUNTS-ONE AND FOUR

We will deal first with the otoges in Counts One and Four of

the indictment relating to the crime against peace, which the Inteiv-

national I-Olitary Tribunal described as ^ "the supreme internatioml
crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains with
in itself the accumulated evil of the whole".

Similarly, Presiding
2

Judge Anderson, in his concurring opinion in the Krupp case, declared
"that aggressive war is the supreme crime and no penalty is too se
vere for those vfho are responsible for it",- And Judge Wilkins,,in-

his Special Concurring opinion in the same case, stated;^
The accusation to have committed a crime against peace is

the gravest that can be raised against any individual.

It

transcends any other crime, as far as regards the sinister
character of the criminal intent, the amount, magnitude and
duration of harm and evil wh'ioh it necessarily involves and
the disregard for the sufferings of persons and entire na

tions, including the wrongdoer's own fellow-citizens and
own country.

A. General Principles of Criminal Liability

The general principles to be applied in determining the guilt or
innocence of the individual defendants in this case are principles

weia^known and generally accepted in the penal law systems of civilized
nations generally. The most elementary and basic principle is that
crimir0-l guilt always requires two elements — action and state of
^

mind.

Both are essential.

*

The fact that a man thinks, desires, or
✓

concludes is not in itself crimiml, no matter how vicious or depraved

these thoughts, desires, or conclusions n^y be,-. Nor is an act, stand

ing alone, ordinarily to be judged criminal, regardless of the actor's
concomitant state of mind or knowledge

That this basic principle is applicable in the field of inter✓

national penal law, just as in domestic penal law, is abundantly ap; from the judgment of the International MUitary Tribunal and
1;;—Vdi,".l/ Trial of the 1-^jor War Criminals, p, 186.
2, Concurring Opinion of Judge'Anderson, in United States v,
Alfried Krupp (Case No, 10), p, 1—2,

3, Special 0oncurring Opinion of Judge V/ilkins^ in United States
V, Alfried ICrupp (Case No, 10), p, 38,
-

3

the judgments in the Farben and Kmpp cases.

Thus, with respect to

the necessary element of "action" of "participation", in the oase be-'
fore the II!T the defendant Kaltenbrunner was acquitted of the charge

of planning and preparing aggressive war because the evidence against
him was not thought to "show his direct participation in any plan to

wage such a v^ar»"^ The defendant von Sohirach was acquitted of the
same charge because "it does not appear.••-.that he participated in the

planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression."^ And the
defendant Sols-cht was acquitted of part of the charge of conspiracy to

wage agg3:»essive v/ar because "his participation in the occupation of
Austria and the Sudetenland## ••T/as on such a limited basis that it

does not amount to participation in the comnion plan."^ Vfith respect
to the requireinent of "knowledge", or "state of mind", we find tl^t
the defendant Streicher v/as acquitted by the HJT because "there is no

evidence to prove that he liad knowledge" of Plitler^s plans

The s^e

is true of the defendants Fritasche (for lade of a^y showing "that he
was informed of the decisions taken"

and Bomann (for lade of a show

ing "that Bormann knew of Hitler's plans to prepare, initiate, or wag©

aggressive wars").^ And, apart from Austria and the Sudetenland, the
acquittal of Sohaoht was also expressly based on lack of knowledge:?
The case against Schacht, therefore, depends on the inference
that Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans.,*.
The Tribunal has....come to the conclusion that this necessary
inference lias not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Krupp and Farben judgments follow the B-'IT decision in import
ing into international penal law, with respect to crimes against peace,

this dual requirement of participation and knoi'/lodge.

Farben judgment, the

Thus, in the

decision is construed as supporting a finding

of guilt "only where the evidence of both knowledge and active partici-

pation v;as conclusive".® Judge Anderson, in his concurring opinion in
1. Vol.'I, Trial of the I^jor War Criminals, p. 291.
2,

Idem^ p. 318-.

3«

Idem^ p. 309.

U.

Idem^ p. 302.
lde:u> p. 338-.

6.

idem> p. 339.

7. . Idom, p. 310.

/

United States v. I^rauch (Case No. 6), p. 29.

nnr'f

.. - .
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the ICrapp judgment, expressed the principle as follows;^
The requisite knowledge, I think can "be shown either by
direct or circumstantial evidence.•••.Such Knowledge
being shov/n, it must be further established that the
aocjused participated in the plan.....
Judge UiUcins^ opinion is to the same effect

The principles of criminal liability applicable with respect
to the Crime Against Peace are the same elementary and

basic principles applicable generally with respect to
other crimes. The basic principle is that criminal guilt
requires two essential elemefits, namely action constituting
a particii)ation in the crime, and criminal intent.

The obsarvancG of those principles is particularly important in

connection with the charge of aggressive "VTar.

The concept of the crime

against peace is of grave import to the world and every nation in it,
and we must insure that the dootriJie is neither extended beyond the

bounds of reason, justice, and common sense, nor contracted into a
meaningless legal stereotype.

The elementaiy legal roquirement that

both participation and knov/ledge bo clearly established is the best
safeguard against killing off the concept of the crime against peace

either by dropsy or malnutrition.

It will benefit no one, least of

all the prosecution, to urge a definition of the crime against peace
which v/Guld sweep v/ithin its purview thousands of more or less ordinary
men and women.

The prosecution would bo the last to suggest a rule

which would incriminate the ordinary soldier v/hose participation in

these gigantic ventures was infinitesmal, or anyone who lacked the

intelligence or opportunity to realize the aggressive character of the
wars of conquest launched by the Third Reich,

By the same token, however, v/e must not adopt a standard which
v/ould exculpate those whoso participation and knowledge are clearly
established.

It is both unnecessary and impossible, and indeed it

would be presumptuous, to attempt any ultiinato detailed statement of
what must be shovm by way of participation and knov/ledgo in order to

establish guilt on the charge of committing crimes a^inst peace.
1,
2.

It

Concurring Opinion Of Judge Anderson, United States v AIfrled
ICrupp (case Mo, 10), p, U?.
Special Concurring Opinion Of Judge Wilkins, United States v#

Alfried ICmpp (Case No. 10), pp. 38-39«

is the very essence of "customary" or "common" law, such as internation~

al pen^l law is, to bring about the refinement and perfection of legal
concepts in application case by case.. As to the requirement of "pajrticij

pation", vre suggest that it is necessary to establish substantial activity in a responsible capacity, directly connected with building

up the povfer of a countiy to wag© v^ar, or with the actual v^ging of
vvar« As to "state of mind", we believe that there must be a shov/ing of
knowledge that military power would be used to carry out a policy of
✓

conquest by war or threat of war.

vThen we speak of "knowledge", we

mean Icnowledge based on information of such amount and kind as must
have brought conviction to a man in the position and circumstances of
the defendant.

We submit that these standards are as precise as general

standards in the law can ever be, and thaj? they are conser-vative in
their scope.

We have stressed these legal requirements because we believe

them fundamental to a wise and just application of the concept of crimes
against peace.

Yfe thihli: that the evidence in this case fu3J.y meets

these requirements, and is more than adequate to establish guilt beyond
a reasomble doubt.

And it will greatly aggravate the risks to which

civilization stands exposed —^ grave as they are no\T —- if this concept

is withered at the roots, by the exoneration of those who are truly
guilty of this terrible crime.
B»

The Relation Between Counb One and Count Four

Count One and Count Four of the indictment in this case each env*

body a charge of the commission of crimes against peace as defined in
I^r, 1 (a) of Article H of Control Council Lav; No. 10.

Count One

charges the initiation of invasions and wars of aggression in violation

of international lav/, including the planning, preparation, initiation,
or waging of v/ars of aggression or v/ars in violation of international

agreements.

Count Four charges the defendants with participating in a

common plan or conspiracy for tho accomplishment of the matters charged

In Count One. Count One of tho Indictmerifc in this case corresponds, in
. general, to Count Two of the inddotmont before the International Iifilitary
Tribunal! Count Four of the indictment in this case corresponds in
- 6 -

goneral to Count One of the indictment before tho BfT.

Count One of

the indictment in this case corresponds in general to Count One of the

indictments in the ICrupp and Farben cases^ and Count Four of this ii>dictment corresponds in general to Count Four in the Krupp case and
Count Five in tho Farben case#

ences and similarities

The relation —• involving both differ

betv/een the charge of planning or isaging ag-^

gressive v/ars on the one hand^ and oonspi2?acy to that end on the other
handj has been discussed or touched on in the THT, Krupp and Farben

judgments^ in numerous arguments before the Nurnberg Tribunals, and in
many speeches and articles concerning the Nurnberg trials#
The classical definition of conspiracy at English common law is

that it is a confederation to effect an unlaY/ful object, or to effect

a lawful object by unlav/ful means#^ Within the scope of this definition, conspiracy is little more than an elaboration of the law of at«-»
✓

tempts, in cases where the conspiracy was unsuccessful in attaining

its object, or of the law of principals and accessories and accomplices,
if the conspiracy succeeded in attaining an unlawful object#

Within

this sphere, the law of conspiracy is, in essence, merely another mani-

festation of the problem, common to all legal systems, of how closely
or in Tfhat way an individual must be connected with a crime in order
to render him criminally responsible#

It should be noted that tho mention of "conspiracy" in Paragraph 1
(a) of Article II of Control Council Lay/ No# 10 is not the only pro
vision of Law No# 10 dealing with this questibn of the degree of con
nection Tvith crime#

Paragraph 2 of Article II is solely concerned v/lth

this same question and doclares that a person is to bo deemed guilty if

he was a "principal" or an "accessory", or vfas connected with the crime

in certain other specific respects.

This paragraph does not ai^ljny the

word "conspiracy", but its scope is, we suggest, at least as broad as
that of the doctrine of conspiracy#

1. Vol. 11, V/harfcon's Criminal Law, (12th Ed#), p# 18^3, and
oases there cited#

*♦. 7
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-

.r, • iiT'r'^fr^'rr l'ii ' fl

In dGSling Td.th tho charge of conspiracy in Count Four of this

indictment^ therefore^ wo are dealing only T/ith the question of vfhat
degree of connection with the crime against peace a defendant must be
shovm to have had in order to render him criminally liable.

In this

field, Anglo-HSaxon jurisprudence used the terminology of principals and

accessories, accomplices and confederates, conspiracies and attemptsr •
✓

In other judicial systems, these v/ords and other v/ords are used.

There

are some differences beinveen the various judicial systems, but the
basic purpose of these concepts is common to all. systems. .
The distinctions and subtleties which have been woven around the

concepts of attempt, accessory, and conspirator in Anglo-Saxon law are
r

very refined and surely thace is much overlapping, as has been pointed

out in a leading tojcfc on Anglo»^axon criminal law.^ Judge Anderson,
in his Concurring opinion in the Krupp case, observed that:^
Conspiracies differ from attempts only in that in the fomer

it is not necessary that the act of the accused shall ap
proach as near to the consummation'of the criminal objective
as in tho latter and in conspiracy, as distinguished from
attempt, two or more persons are necessarily involved.
Where, as in this case, many more than two persons are involved and

the criminal objective was actually consummated, the distinction be-

tween criminal guilt as a conspirator, or as a principal, accessory,
or confederate, becomes wellnigh imperceptible.
^

y

Is there, then, any real distinction between the charges in

Counts One and Four of this indictment?

Judge Anderson has expressed

the view that the offense of "conspiracy" is identical v;ith the offense

of "plannir^, preparation, or initiation" of aggressive war, but tl^t
"waging" is a distinct offense. As he put itj3
As already pointed cut, the
seems to have regarded
the '"planning, preparation, initiation and waging" of"
aggressive wars as constituting tv/o separate offenses,
one consisting of the acts of "planning, preparation and
initiation", and tho other of "v/agmg" aggressive v/ar.
1. Vol. II, Wharton*s Criminal Law (12th Ed,), p, I86l,
2# Concurring opinion of Judga'Anderson in United States v,
Alfried KrUpp (Case No, 10), p« 36.
y

3, Idem, p, 5?^

8

To repeat^ the offense of planning,, preparation and '
initiation of aggressive 7/ars is, in practical effect,
the same as the conspiracy.

Very lilcaly Judge Anderson vra-s led to this conclusion by the cireiuar'

stance that the IMP acquitted the defendant Doenitz of conspiracy to
•wage aggressive -wars, and expressly found that he did not plan, pre«
✓

^

pare, or initiate such -wars, but nonetheless convicted him of ivaging

aggressive wars.^ And, at first glance, one might find further sux>port for Judge Anderson*s conclusion in the following language from

the U® 'judgment;^
ELanning and preparation are essential to the making of war^
In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a criuo
under international law,' The Charter defines this offense

as planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of
aggression "or participation in a Common Plan or Conspira-cy
for the accomplishment,.#,,of the foregoing"... The Indictment
follows this distinction. Count One charges the Common Plan
or Conspiracy, Ccqnt Two charges the planning and i-vaging of
war. The same evidence has been introduced to support bbth

Counts, We shall therefore discuss both Countis together, as
they are in substance the'same.

The defendants have been

charged under both Counts, and their guilt under each Count
must be determined,

Indedd, this language on its face seems to go even farther than the

Doenitz decision, and to remove the distinction between the charge of
conspiracy and the charge of "waging" aggressive war.

But, despite the language quoted above, when it came to determinigg
the guilt or innocence of the individual defendants, the II.IP came to
veiy different conclusions under Count One of that indictment — charging
conspiracy —^ than it did under Count Two, which charged with the plan✓

✓

ning, preparation, initiation and waging of aggressive wars,. Bight de^fendants were convicted under Count One and fourteen were acquitted*
Twelve defendants were convicted under Count Two and only four were

acquitted^ six were not charged under Count Two, What a judgment ac
tually stands for is to be determined much more by what it finally
holds than by two or three sentences taken from an opinion I70 pages
long. And the actual holdings of the IMT judgment show that the IMP

1,

Vol, I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p, 310,

2.

Idem,, p, 22l|..

—p

treated the charge of conspiracy very differently from the charge of

planning and 'vjaging aggressive -war.

Nor do the actual holdings con

form ai^ better to Judge Anderson's conclusion tl».t "71/aging" is to be

treated separately, but that "planning, preparing, and initiation of
✓

-

aggressive v/ars is, in practical effect, the same as the conspiracy^
This is clearly shovm by the decision with respect to the defendant

Funk, who was acquitted on the charge of conspiracy, but v/as neverthe
less convicted on the charge of planning and preparing aggressive i^r.
The judgment with respect to Funk stated thatr^
Funk..♦..took

office as Hinister of Economics and as Pleni

potentiary for Tfer Economy in early 1938, and as President
of the Reichsbank in Januaiy 1939.*«...

Funk became active in the oconoraio field after the Nazi plans
to --yjage aggS»essive war had been clearly defined....,On 30 May
1939, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economics attend
ed a meeting at which detailed plans were made for .the finan
cing of the war.

On 25 August 1939, Funk wrote a letter to Hitler expressing
his gratitude tlmt he was able to participate in su.ch v/orld
shaking events; that his plans for the "financing of the
war", for the control of v;age and price conditions and for

the strengthening of the "Reichsbank had been completed; and
that he had inconspicuously transferred into gold all for
eign' exchange resources available to Germany.

On Ik October

1939, after the war had begun, he made a speech in v/hich he

'

stated that the economic and financial departments of Gernsry,

"vforking under the Four Year Plan, had been engaged in the
secret economic preparation for v/ar for over a year.

Funlc participated in the economic planning v^hich preceded the
attack on the U.S.S.R. His deputy held daily conferences
with Rosenberg on the economic problems which would arise in

the occupation of Soviet territory.

Funk himself participat

ed in planning for the printing of ruble notes in Germany
prior to the attack, to sei*ve as occupation currency in the

>U#S.S.R. After the attack he made a speech in vfhich he de

scribed plans he had made for the economic axploitation of
the "vast territories of the Soviet Union" which were to be
used as a source of raw material for Europe.

Funk was not one of the leading figures in originating the

H&zi plans for aggressive Trar,.»He did, however, participate
in the economic preparation for certain of the aggressive I'ra.rs,
notably those against Poland and the Soviet Union, but liis

guilt can be adequately dealt with under Count Two of the
indictment.

The Tribunal proceeded to acquit Funk of the charge of conspiracy
bodied in Count One, but convicted him under Count Two, and the

1. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p, 301^-5,

#«• 10 —

^,5"

quotation above shows that it was for planning and preparing aggressive

wars.

This, wo submit, clearly establishes that the IMT regarded the

evidence against Funlc as insufficient to convict him on the charge of

conspiracy but sufficient to convict him on the charge of planning

and preparing aggressive war, and this decision is inconsistent with
Judge Anderson^s viev/ tha.t "planning, preparation and initiation of

aggressive wars is, in practical effect, the same as the conspiracy"#
To the same effect is the DfT judgment with respect to the defendant

Frick#^
-The reason why the JM construed the concept of "conspiracy" more
narrowly than the concept of "planning, preparing, initiating and waging"
is clear, I thinlc, if we keep in mind that in these proceedings we are

applying international penal law, and that we must not approach these

problems solely from the standpoint of ar^ single judicial system# During

the last century, continental jurists have regarded the concept of
conspiracy as somev/hat dangerous and, on the whole, lonnecessary in view

of the broadening of the concept of attempts# Thus, "conspiracy (Komplott),
as a distinct offense, was stricken from the revised codes of many of the
•2

German states during the 19th century"#

Many French jurists also look

upon the doctrine of conspiracy with disfavor. The French member of the
^3
IJfC, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, has statedj

The general notion of conspiracy is peculiar to British law.
The indictment includes in this term the entire Hitlerian^
enterprise leading to tha seizure of power and to aggressive
war..#.#

The danger of such incriminations is to open the ^or to
despotism. The charge of conspiracy is the favorite weapon
of tyranny

1# Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p# 299-300.
2. Vol. IT, T'Jharton's Criminal Law (12th Ed.), p# 1861.3. Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Process de Nuremberg, unpublished
lecture, spring of 19h5s to the Associations des Etudes
Internationales et Criminologiques. .
-11^
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vj-P suFf'estj9 fully explain why the

The above consideraTiionsj we

applied the concept of "conspiracy" to international penal law moh

more mrrowly than the concept of "planning^ preparing, initiating and
™agtog"» under the DfT holdings, it appears that, in order to he

of conspiracy, the defendant must have occupied a more prominent role, •
or have been in closer contact with the Chief of State, than is necessary
to the case of "planning, preparing, initiating and waging". Thus, to
the case of the defendant Funk, the DH found that he was "not one of

the leading figures to originating the Nazi plans for aggressive vjar."^
And with respect to the defendant Friok, who was also acquitted of con

spiracy but convicted of "planning, preparing, initiating, and wagtogS
the IMI' stateds^

The evidence does not show that he participated to

conferences at which Hitler outlined his aggressive intentiow.

Consequently the Tribunal takes the view that Frick was not a
member of the common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive
war as defined in "^his judgment.

It is too soon to tell what place the doctrine of conspiracy will
eventually occupy in international pei^l jurisprudence# In the

judgmantj the views of the continental jurists prevailed. }ltr» Henry L.
StiiTison criticized the BCT judgment on -precisely this ground:^
If there is a weakness in the Trlbunalfs findings, I believe

it lies in its very IBnited construction of the legal concept
of conspiracy. That only eight of the 22 defendants should
have been found guilty on the count of conspiracy to conuBxt
the various crimes involved in the indictment seems to me

surprising^

I believe that the Tribunal would have been

justified in a broader construction of the law of conspiracy.**
In his opinion in the Krupp case. Judge Anderson came to a contrary
conclusiontU
No less authority than 15r, Henry L. Stimson, one of the
greatest American statesmen and lawyers, has regretted
that the IMT gave a restricted construction to the pro
visions of'the London Charter relating to the crime'of

conspiracy, but with due deference to all concerned, I
have felt bound to disagree.

1.

Voli I, Trial of the Tfejor ¥far Criminals, p-. 30^.

2.

Idem., p» 299

3* Benry Li Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trials Landmark in Law,

Vol 2^ "foreign Affairs" No, 2 (January 19U7), p. IQTT"
I4.

Concurring Opinion of Judge'Anderson in United States v.
Alfried Krupp (Case Noi 10), p. 72.
— 12

In the present case, at least as to most of the defendants, the
distinction drawn by the

between "conspiracy" and "planning, pre^

paring, initiating, and waging" is, vfe believe, academic, for most of
the defendants attended cne or more of the Hitler conferences which

Funk and Frick did not attend*

As is apparent from the JMS judgnient,

attendance at these conferences, or other opportunity to learn at first
hand of Hitler's intentions, vjas the test generally utilized by the
IMT to determine whether

an individual defendant was guilty of con-

spirac3% Consequently, most of these defendants woiad fall within the
more limited concept of conspiracy adopted by the BfT and Judge Ander
son*

Before leaving the subject of conspiracy, a special v;ord should
be added with respect to the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
In the indictment before the W, these invasions were charged as

criminal aggressive acts committed in the course of the conspiracy de«
nounced in Count One, but were not charged as elements of "planning,
f

'

'

'

'

preparing, initiating, and waging" in Count Two. Consequently, although
seven of the eight defendants^ convicted of conspiracy wore convicted

in part on the basis of the invasions of Austria and CzechoslovaidLa,
none of the convictions under Count Two YJ-ere or could have been based
on the Austrian and Czeohoslovakian invasions.

Thus, although the de-

fendarrfc Kaltenbrunnor was found to have been connaoted with the invasion
of Austria, the IMT pointed out that "the Anschluss, although it was an

aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war",2 and the same ob
servation was made in the case of Schacht*^

In the present case, however, the invasions of Austria and Gzechoslo"vakia are not only charged as components of the conspiracy under
Count Four of this indictment, but also as invasions and aggressive
acts under Count One. And the B!T found tt^t the seizures of Austria

and Czechoslovakia were "invasions" and "acts of aggression"^ and ex
pressly held that the occupation of Austria was a "crime within the
1.

All but Rosenberg.

2. Vol» I, Trial of the li&jor War Criminals, p, 291*
3»

Idem#, p, 309*

i+. Idenu, pp, 192, 19lt>^nd 198*
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jurisdiotion of the Tribunal"

Consonuently^ whereas the BIT I'vas o-

bliged under the indictment before it to treat the invasions of Austria
and Czechoslovakia only under the charge of "conspiracy"^ no such ne-*
cessity exists under the indictment in this case#

C«

The Responsibility of I!ilitary Leaders for
Grimes Against Peaoe

Throughout the proceedings before this Tribunal and before the

BIT, the defense has contended that the military leaders, by virtue of

the veiy nature of their profession, are not susceptible to prosecution
for crimes against peace and "ivar crimes*

The reasoning in support of

this position has been stated in various ways*

Sometimes it takes the

form of the argument that the doctrine of superior orders is a complete
defense to the prosecution of a military leader*

Before the BvIT, Dr,

Laternser declared that the Gem&n military leaders were being prose-,

cuted because they served their country as soldiers, and argued that

a military man "is not allowed to decide for himself whether the cause

for which he fights is good or bad", and that it is "his duty to obey
s-nd to ask no questions"Counsel for L.eeb took the same position be

fore this Tribunal*3 in this respect, counsel went farther tt&n the
defendant Leeb himse3f, who agreed that the acts of a soldier, as of
Anyone else, imist be limited by his own "hm&n conscience", and that a

soldier is under no duty to commit crime,^
This argument of military immunity, which would reduce military
men to a sort of sub-human status as mon incapable of exercising moral

judgment on their own behalf — no more answerable to the lavrs of God
s.nd man than animals and sii^ll children
a-Qceptanoo in international pen&l law.
y

has, fortunately, found no
The same arguments were made
y

^

on behalf of the defendants Koitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder before
1«

Vol. I, Trial of the I4ajor War Criminals, p, 318,

2,

KLea before the IMT by Dr, Kans Laternser, p,

3*

Opening Statement of Dr, Laternser, p, iB,

it.

Testimony of Fieldmarshal Leeb before the Commission of the
BIT, pp, 1615-16,

*. m -

the BIT and-ware unqualifiedly rojeoted#

KeitaL, Jodlj Doerdtz^ and

Raeder were all found guilty of ca^imes against peace, in addition to
•war ordjnes and crimes against humanity^

Before the Numberg Llilitary

Tribunals established Under Control Council Lav; No» 10, military leaders
were held ansv/erable under the laws of v^ar and con"7icted of v^ar crimes

by Tribunal v in the so-called "hostage" case (United States v. List,
✓

^

et al,, (Case No; 7), as v;ell as in the Medical case and the lulch

case.^ The responsibility of military loaders for crimes against peace
has not been involved in any of the pro-vious trials under Law No, 10,

but both the garben and Krupp oudgments indicate quite clearly tiiat the
mili-tary leaders are answerable, just as is ar:yono else, if their
guilt is established by the e-vidence* Thus, in the judgment of Tribun
al VI acquitting the Farben defendants on the charge of crimes against
peace, the Tribunal statodj2

The defendants now before us were neither high public offi
cials in the civil governtnent nor high military officers.
Their participation v^as that of followers and not leaders.

A.nd Judge Anderson, in his concurring opinion dismissing the charges of
aggressive warfare against the IhTupp defendants, stressed that the de✓

fends.nts in that case "were priTOte citizens and nonoombatants", and
that none of them ted any "control over the conduct of the viar or over

any of tho armed forces; nor wero any of them parties to the plans
pursuant to v;hich the wars were •V7aged"»3

If those remarks are diota, the judgmont of the njC is not. The

decisions as to Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz and Raeder categorically and un
equivocally establish that military leaders, just as other men, are
bound: by f;Ke oUlgatidM or ffl-fernational law and can be proseaSted"""
for Violations thereof, whether the charge be the commission of crimes

against peace or of crimes against tho laws and cfustoms of

Il>«

deed, the BU* went much farther, and squarely expressed the view that
1, United States v, Karl Brandt, et al*, (Case No, l)j United
States V, Erhardt Milch (Case No, 2);
United States v, Carl Krauch, et al,, (Case No, 6), p, 63,
3,

Concurring opinion 6f Judge Anderson in United States v, Al-

fried Krupp, et al,, (case No, 10), p, 65,

M l5
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many military leaders, other than the four ivhom It convicted as indi✓

viduals, must also have been guilty of crimes against peace and "war
crimes.

The IMT declined to render a. declaration of criminality against

the General Staff and High Command on the ground that it was not an

"organizatioh" or "grcfup" within the meaning of that word as used in

the London Charter, but in so doing the

declaredjl

Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term «^oup"
in Article 9 must'mean something more than this collection of

militaiy officers, it has heard much evidence as to the par

ticipation of the officers in planning and waging aggressive

war, and in committing War Grimes and Crimes against Humanity,
This evidence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.

Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to
trial so that those among them who are guilty of these
crimes should not escape punishment.

We may tafce it as established, then, that the guilt or innocence
of these defendants under Counts One and Four of the indictment is to be

determined on the basis of the same principles as are applicable in the
I

case of other defendants charged T/ith the planning and waging of aggress
ive war. We come back once again to the two necessary elements of act
and state of mind.

In order to establish their guHt, it must be

shown that they carried on. substantial activity in a responsible ca

pacity in connection with the planning or waging of war.

It must be

shown that they carried on suoh activity with the knowledge that the

military power would be used, or was being used, to carrj'- out a pclicj'
of conquest by means of aggressiYe wars or the threat of aggressive
wars.

In order to determine whether the element of "participation" has

been sufficiently established against any given defendant, it is necessary
to establish the position or positions which he occupied at the time the
✓

aggressive wars were being planned and vra-ged, and the nature and scope
of the authority, responsibility, and duty which attached to his posi
tion or positions.

In this connection, v/e suggest, the defendant >s

rank is but one factor to be considered among numerous others.

1, Vol, I, Trial of the ifejor War Criminals, pp, 278-79,
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To be

sure, it is ordinarily tiue that a General discharges more important
and responsible functions than a Major, that he is in a better position
to influence the course of events, and that he is likely to have bettea>

access to information. But this is by no means universally truei A.

young staff officer of relatively junior rank at OM or OKH, for instance,
might well have much better informa-tion and far more actual influence
in planning operations that a very much more senior officer in a rou
tine training or administrative position. In the field, the Chief of
Staff of an Am^r or Am^ Grcfup would ordinarily have responsibilities

and information of far broader scope tls-n the comniander of s division,
though the latter might well be of senior rank, Ih short, the matter
of rank should not be altogether overlooked, but it should not be given

more Y/eight than the circumstances in any given case warrant.

Similarly, as a general and abstx^tct proposition of internatioi^l

penal law, vre can not gauge the question of participation solely by the
size of tte fomation "which an officer commands.

In wars betvfeen the

ne.jor militaiy powers the connnandor of a battalion, regiment, bri^de
or even division may not loom veiy large.

But in Yjars between the

small countries, a battalion or even a compai^ may be the strategic

equivalent of a division, Analagously, the role of the German mili
tary leaders in the conquest of Denmark is not to be lightly pushed
aside merely because the Danish airoy Yvas small and therefore very ^evsr

Geme-n troops

to be employed to effect the conquest of Denmark,

In short, in determining such questions as the degree of "parti—

oipation", or whether the information available to a man must have
been stifficient to bring conviction to his mind, wo must apply the
standards of raaaorKLble men to the circumstances in each case as they
appear from the evidence,

D, The E'Vidanco'Relied Upon by the BffTt ICeitel,
Jodl, Raeder and Doonita

Bofore turning to tho o'viddnco with respect to the defendants in

this case, it will be profitable to look once more at the opinion of
the BET, By e^oamining the judgnusnts of tho BIT against tho militaiy

17 ^

^

defendants in that case

Keitel^ JodL, Raoder and Doenita

ive may

ascertain what facts and circumstances were held to constitute the

necessary evidence v/ith respect to participation and knowledge in order

to support the verdict of guilty v;hioh was rendered as to all four of
those defendants*
«>

^

There was,, of course, a fifth military defendant tried by the
Its? ^

Hermann Goering, who v/as the Coniniander^ii>-«Chief of the Luftv/affe*

Goering, however, was not a career soldier, and his offices and re
sponsibilities under the Third Reich v/-ere of so varied a nature that
✓

•

his inclusion with Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, and Doenitz vrould not be il✓

-

-

luminating. We may note, however, that the Bffi, in finding liim guilty
of crimes against peace, stressed the role which the Luftivaffo played
in the subjugation of Czechoslovakia, Goering's meetings with Hitler

and the other military leaders on 23 I'^y 1939 and 22 August 1939 "vhich

preceded the attack on Poland, his participation in planning the inva«
i

sion of Norway, and his status as Gommander-in-Chiof of the Lufty/affe
in all of the aggressive wars,
✓

•

Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, had no command authority over the
three branches of the Wehrmaoht, but w^ in effect the Chief of Hitler^s

own military staff, which assisted and advised the Puohror in the preparation of his directives and coordinated the operations of the Army,

Navy, and Air Foroe,^ Keitel was hold to have been connected vfith all
the invasions and aggressive wars involved in the IMT case*

With re—•

speot to Austria, Keitel — together y/ith Reichenau and the defendant

Sperrle

• attended the conforenoe with Schusclinigg in February 1938,

in order to make a "militaiy demonstration"#

When Sohuschnigg called

for a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence, Keitel par
ticipated in the improvised military arrangements for the march into

Austria,

During the ensuing months, Keitel signed or initialled many
✓

of the OKW directives and memoranda in the so-called "Fall Gmien", the
plan for the militaiy destiniction of Czechoslovakia, After toiich, he

\,

initialled other directives for the conquest of the remainder of V; .•..)•

1#

Vol# I, Trial of the Ifejor War Criminals, p, 288*-289,
m 18—

Czechoslovakia,,.

Keitel ivas present at the conference with hitler on

23 l^y 1939, when the Fuehrer announced his intention "of attacking Poy

land at the first suitable opportunity'*^ and signed or initialled vari-ous of the directives in connection with "Fall Weiss"^. the plan for the
military destruction of Poland.-

The plans for the invasion of Norway

and Denmark wore originated by the Gerir&n Navy, and were finally com-»
pleted by a special inter-service staff under Keitel's supervision.
y

Keitel signed various directives for the attack in the "West, in violay

y

tion of the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.

He ini

tialled numerous diroctivos for the wars against Groeoo and Tugoslavia^

Ho initialled many directives in "Fall Barbarossa", the plan-for the
✓

military destruction of the U.S.S.R., and attended Hitler's conference

with the military leaders on lU «}ane 19^-il, just before the attack. •
Jodl was a Section Chief in the

in charge of operational

planning.^ The evidonoe relied upon by the UC to support his con
viction in general parallels the evidence against Keitel.

Jodl, how

ever, was assigned to a minor troop command from September 1938 to
September 1939, and accordingly "ivas not found to have been involved in
the occupation of Bohemia and Horavia or the attack against Poland.

He

y

participated in improvising the plans for tho invasion of Austria, and
initialled many of the directives and memoranda in "Fall Gruen",

He

played a part in planning the invasion of Norway and Denmark and the
y

attack in the West, and continued his planning activities in connection
with the invasions of Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union,

Ho was

present at the conference between Hitler and the military loaders on
lii Juno I9l-!l, just before the Russian campaign,

Raeder was tho Goramander-ln-Chief of the Gorman Navy from 1928 to

19U3»^ In support of his conviction on the charge of crimes against

peace, the B'TT found him responsible for re-armament of the German
Navy in violation of the Treaty of Versailles,
^

He was present, along

y

with Goering, von Frltsch, and others, at the conference in November

1, Vol.. I, Tr3al of the Major War Criminals, pp. 322-32li.
2, Voly.-!, Trial of the l^jor War Criminals, pp, 31$-3l6,
- 19 -

1937

which Hitler outlined his plans for the eventual occupation of

Austria and Czechoslovakia^ and received various of the directives in
connection with "Pall Gruen".

He likewise received directives in conr-

nection with the attack against Poland^ and directed the supporting
activities of the Na-yy in connection therev/ithi he was present at the
meetings with Hitler in

his intentions*

and August 1939 at vhich Hitler announced

On the suggestion of a subordinate, Raeder initiated

the idea of invading Norway, and his staff participated through the OKST
in developing the plans for the attack on Denmark and Norway,

He re

ceived many directives in connection with the v/ars against Greece, "Tugo-

slavia, and the Soviet Union, and the German Na-yy lent minor support to
these operations.

Doenitz "VTas acquitted on the charge of conspiracy, ,and his con
viction under Count Two of the indictment before the BIT was based on

much narrower grounds than in the case of the other three military de

fendants.^ He v;as a Rear Admiral in cominand of the submarine arm of
the German Navy when war broke out, but rose rapidly and suocoedGd
Raeder as Commander-in-chief of the Navy in 19U3« He was not present
at any of the important conferencos where Hitler*s decisions were an

nounced. He was convicted of waging aggressive war apparently upon the
basis that the U-boat arm v/as the most important part of the German
fleet, and that he received sufficient advance information in order to
coordinate subm^ine operations with the other activities of the Wohr-

macht. V/ith respect to the invasion of Norway and Denmark, the BtT

emphasized that Doenitz made out the operational orders for the sup
porting U-boats in March 19^0, five weeks in advanco of the actual
attack.

E.

The General Scope of the TSvidencd Against the Defendants
in the Present Case.

If we apply the principles which have been set forth above to the

present case, it will appear that the evidence is abundant and more than

1.. Vol.. I, Trial of the l^jor War Criminals, pp, 206, and 310-311,
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sufficiGnt to estabXish the requisite degree of participation and

knowledge on the part of the^e defendants. Furthermore, in the case
of most of the defendants^ the evidence is very parallel to and quite

as strong as the evidence relied upon by the 315T in convicting ICeitel,

Jodl, and Raeder, As to one or two of the defendants — such as the
defendant von Roques

where the ovidence under Counts One and Four

fall short of this standard, tho proof is nonetheless as strong as or

stronger than the proof on the basis of which Doenitz was convicted by
the B5T of v/aging aggressive "v/ar.

In terms of the nature of "participation" it will be observed

that the thirteen defendants should be divided into two more or less

distinct groups. Four of the defendants — Schniewind, Reinecko, T^arlimont and Lehmann — wore leading staff officers vfhose activities were

carried on at the very highest levels, the OKET and the OKM. To borrow

a phrase from American military vocabulary, we would say that these
four defendants functioned "at Yfar Department level". The importance

of Schniewindis position as chief of the Iteinelcommandoamt and Chief of
Staff of the SKL, where he was in charge of all matters pertaining to
✓

operations ani intelligence, needs no emphasis. During the years from
1938 to I9I1I, when the invasions and aggressive "wars were planned and
launched, Schniewind's role in planning and guiding the operations of
tho Geimian Ravy as a whole was second only to that of Raeder himself.
✓

With Raader, he attended three of the four conferences stressed by the
IMT at which Hitler outlined his plans, so heavily relied upon by the
HIT in finding Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder guilty of conspiracy to v<ago^

aggressive war. He was active in the invasion of Norway and Denmark,
in which the Navy played a major rolo. Ha received tho same directives
which Raeder received in oonnootion with tho wars in which tho Goiraan
Navy played a smallor part.

During the same period, Reineoke and Lehmann wore tho chiefs of

important departments of tho OKW. Thdy wero not directly concerned
with operations, and did not attend the major meetings which Hitler
held with the military leaders, but each within his own sphora — law,
prisoners of war affairs, and othor Important fields —was called upon
r* 21 •-»

to plan for coming oporationsj and to issue appropriate directives
during the course of the •wars and for the occupation of eneny terri-

tory»

Thus,, in ad"vanoe of the Russian csampaign, Lehmann participated
.1] Tim

I

I

*"" "

in preparing and distributing the "Commissar Order", and Reinocke made

plans for the screening and handling of Russian prisoners of "wari

The defendant Yferliinont v/as not directly responsible to Kcitol,

and -was junior in rank to Reineclce, but as chief of the most iinportant
section in Jodl*s dGpartnoent, YiTarlimont's role in planning and T/aging
of aggressive ivar -was much more iinportant than that of Reineoke. As

Chief of the Planning Section of Jodl's department, Warlimont was fully

informed of all operational intentions, and participated actively in
the preparation of operational plans, but his activities transcended

purely operational matters, and it is safe to say tt^t no defendant in
the dock was connected in such a multiplicity of ways virith the planning
and waging of aggressive "war as was Warlimont. He is a prii^e example
of the fact that the in^iortance of a inilitaiy leader's aoti'vities and
the information at his disposal can not be determinQd merely by his
rank.

The other nine defendants vfere all top level field commandGrs.

The defendant iSfltaaflift,. from the outbreak of the war to August 19i|i;,

commanded an Air Fleet (luftflotto), the Air Force equivalent of an
Army Group. He transferred to the Luftwaffe at about the time of the

denunciation of the arms limitation of the Treaty of Versailles in

1935, and, as Corwoander of the Condor Legion in SBaln^.. gcmandod the

revived air ana of the Wehnraoht in its first combat tost. Sporrlo^
together with Keitol and Reichenau, partioipatod in the "military dor.h'
onstration" at the Schuschnigg conforencQ, and Sperrle coinmandGd the

Air Force whioh would have been used for the conquest of Czechoslovakia
%

pursuant to "Fall Gruen". As Commander of the Gorman Air Forces in the

West, Sperrle participated in numorous highr^evel planning^, conferences
Snd in the prcps-rstion and GOcecution of the invasion of the Low Countries
and France#

Of the other eight defendants, all except Roques were top flight

^

22 **

Arn^ fiold coinmndGrs who, daring the course of tho war, coimaanded

Arro^ Groups or Armies*

The overall plans of campaign for Germany! s
✓

aggressive wars were laid dovm in diroctivos from OM and OKH, and their
practical application in tho field was developed by the Army Group and
Army corimanders pursuant to these directives, and in consultation with
the Commandor^in-Chief of the Am^ and his Chief of Staff,

As is

clearly shown by the Haider Diary and a mass of other evidence, the

leading figures in the final development of these plans were the Commanders-in-Chiof of the Arr;^ Groups and Amies and their Chiefs of
✓

Staff, and the Commander-^in-ChiaX of tho Army, von Brauchitsch, and

his Chief of Staff, Haider* During the period from 1938 to June 19lil,
when tho Invasions and aggressive wars were being planned and launched,
all of these defendants except Reinliardt and Roques wore, at one time
✓

or another, Commanders-irHJliiof or Cliiefs of Staff of Armies or Arn^

Groups* Until the end of 19iA, the defendant Leeb, von Rundstedt, and
von Bock were the only three Army Group commanders..

The defendant

Kaeohlor, from the very beginning, was the Commandor-in-ChiGf of an
Army, and he succeeded Leeb, upon the lattor's retirement, as the
CoiTiriiander-in-Chief of an Army Group.

The defendant Hoth was a Corps

Commander during the Polish and Western campaigns, but commanded a

Fanaer Group, the tactical equivalent of an Aimiy, when the Russian ii>.
vasion was launched*

The defendant Salmuth was the Chief of Staff of

an Amy Group until

I9I4I, when he became a Corps Commander* The

✓

defendant Hollidt v;as the Chief of Staff of an Arny until the con

clusion of the Polish campaign, at T/hich time he bocame a Divisional
CoMTiander.

The defendant Roinhardt was first a Divisional and then a

Corps Covoiiiandar, and succeeded Hoth as tho oomander of a Panaar Group
a few raontl:^ after the launching of tho Russian invasion*

The de-

f endanbs Roques and Woelilor are charged under Count One only vd.th ro^
speot to the aggressive war against the Soviet Unionj Woehler was at
✓

that time the Chief of Staff of an Amy, and Roques was the Commander

of an Ariiy Group Rear Area, with the status of a Corps Commander*

Of

those defendants, Leeb, ICuoohler, Ifcth, and Salmuth attended several of

the meetings at "v^ich Hitler declared his intentions, Woohlor^ as

Clii^ of Staff•of the "Eleventh Army, participated extensively in planr^
✓

'

ning the campaign against the Soviet Union, and Reinhardt and Roques
developed tactical plans at corps level,

F,

The Contentions of the Defense, Analyzed
by Way of Illustration

The foregoing is but the barest skeleton outline of the evidence

against the defendants under Counts One and Four of the indictment.

In

j

our brief covering Counts One and Four, we are including a detailed

suimnation of the evidence with respecrt to dach defendant, and it would
serve no useful purpose to duplicate here v/hat we are setting forth in
the brief.

Before concluding our statement under Counts One and Four, hovfever,
we will devote sorae attention to the contentions which have been put

forth on the part of the defense to meet the prosecution^a evidence.

Most of these defenses and explanations are common to all or most of
the defendants, and it would be possible to discuss these defenses in

general terms. We think, however, that it will be more helpful to the
Tribunal if we analyse these defenses in the specific form in which

they haVe been put forth by several of the individual defendants, for

in this manner the factual and legal issues will be more closely joined.
We will discuss these defenses, therefore, by examining the evidence
which has been adduced and the arguinonts which have been advanced on

behalf of the defendants Leeb, Schniewind, and Lehmann,
1,

Von Leob

The defendant von Leob was in retiroinont from February until JUly

of 1938, and accordingly playgd no part in the invasion of Austria, He

was not involved in the invasion and occupation of Denmark and Norway,
nor of Greece and Yugoslavia, and is not oliargod under the paragraphs

dealing with the aggressive wars against those four countries,

Leob and

Rundstedt, as the two most senior German generals^ played a loading part
in the expansion of the German army between 19S3 and 1938, and Leeb is

^ 2i|. «

specifioally charged in connection vrith the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

and the aggressive "wars launched in three major campaigns i against Po-

land, France and the United Kingdom in 1939, against Belgium, Holland,
and Luxembourg in 19iiO, ^nd against the Soviet Union in 19i4l»
Before dealing with Leeb's role in these aggressive wars, we

v/ould like first to dispose of certain arguments put forth in his be—
y

half vrliioh seen to us patently "vride of the nark.

For example, Leeb

testified that he wrote a book on defensive warfare,.?- and his coonseHs
opening statement laid great stress on the supposed contrast betwe<^
the fact that Leeb is charged here vri.th v/aging aggressive war and the

fact that he is a specialist in defensive warfare#^ The prosecution is
quite unable to perceive the relevance of this evidence.

It is quite

apparent that a nation "wfliiGh is defending itse3-f against an aggressive

attack may wall., if it is able, adopt offensive strategy and tactics in
self defense; it is equally apparent that an aggressor nation my find

it necessary at times to resort to defensive strategy and tactics. The
defendant Scliniewind during the course of his testimony pointed out

very clearly the "distinction tietv/een military offensive measures and
measures pertaining to aggressive ivar".-^ The armour plating on a baty

tloship is defensive annament, and soldiers we»r helmets to protect
y

their heads from injuiy, but if the battleship attacks the naval forces
✓

of a peaceful and friendly nation, or if the soldier engages in an
armed onslaught against a peaceful neighboring countiy, the armour
plating and the helmet are surely being used for aggressive purposes.

This argument is, to put it bluntly, siiuply childish, And in ary event,
when Leeb^s forces broke tlircugh the Maginot Line,., and whan, tiaey. marched

from East Prussia to the gates of Leningrad, Leeb was not conducting de
fensive YTarfare*

Certain other contentions are qqually superficial.

Thus Leeb

stressed his opposition to National Socialism because of its "vocifoi*eus
1,

Tr.

2,

Opening statement by Dr, Laternser, pp» 1, o,

2280,

'

3 m Tr, p. USiil,

fe• syM

clUyaor" and its ant1—religious aspeots;^ he repeatedly emphasized that
he is devoutly religious,2 ^nd that he protested Hinrnler^s decree en

couraging mothers to bear children out of Y/edlock53 his counsel in so
many yrords accused the prosecution of being "prejudiced" and "not solely
guided by principles of justice" because v/e have accused Leeb and othei'

"decent people of the best families";^ v/itnesses on behalf of Leehv snoh
y

'

as General Hfilders-also testified that he v/as devout, and that ho suf
fered certain minor annoyances from the Nazis because of anti^^azi ut

terances by his Tfife,^ Similar evidence has been given on behalf of
other defendants.

These contentions do not touch the prosecution^s

case, and accomplish only the destruction of straw men, Yfe emphasized
again and again in our opening statement that the defendants are not
charged with being J^zis, and we described in detail the numerous points
of friction between Hitler and his party cohorts on the one,hand, and

the Wehrmacht on the other.

None of tho defendants is charged Yfith

being anti-religious, and no attempt l^s bean made to disparage tho
family background of any of them.

These raatters are, to be sure, of

importance in evaluating an individualis entire character, but they do
not seem to us of much significance in ascertaining the defendant Loeb's

share in preparing and waging aggressive war in tho light of the mass of
direct evidence in the record.

Accordingly, let us look at the evidence with respect to Leeb's
role in the occupation of the Sudetenland,

The OHHf directive for mili

tary action against Czechoslovakia was issued in May 1938, when Leeb
y

was in temporary retirement^ on the witness stand, Le6b could not re

call when he first gained knowledge of "Fall Gruen",^ According to
Leeb, he learned at some unspecified date that ho was to coiMand an
A.nry — the Twelfth Amy — for the proposed operation against
1,

Tr,. p. 2281-82,.

2,

Tr, p,. 2287,.

3,

(Dp. p. 2283-811.,
•

y

U#. opening Stat eraent of Dr. laterr^ar, p, 21,

5,

Tr, p, 1926-27,

6.

Tr,. p» 2300.,

Czechoslovakia,

He had been on vacation in the nountains,. and sone-

tdme in August he caano to Hunioh to discuss the plan*

Thorearter^

"during the nonth of August and September'* he "continued to parti

cipate in the vrorking out of the preparation of the TwelXth Arn^".l
Leeh did not "expect the possibility of an armed conflict", because,

according to hin, Germany proposed only to occupy "a border area",
"20 to 30 kilometers deep".

In this area there were "either no
✓

,

Czech troops at all", or "if they were stationed there at all,
would probably withdravf to the rear areas, in case of our ad
vance"*

At the end of September "the tvro interested western powers

gave their aggreement and consent", and "this invasion was carried
Out in a peaceful manner".

He expressed the astonishing opinion

that "probably no shot would have been fired even if this agreement

(the itoich Agreement) had not been reached prior to the invasion",^
The actual facts, clearly established by the documents in the
record and the testimony of the defense witness HHalder, tell a

totally different story,

Leeb^s service record shows that, although

he Y/as in retirement^ he was made available for service with the

Genran Army Headquarters at 1.5unich on 1 July 1938,^ Leeb wag a lo
gical choice to lead an Ari:]y into Czechoslovakia; from 1930 to 193^
he had commanded the JOlitary District at Itmich, and he was an

inhabitant of Bavaria and "knevT all about the Bavarian forest area",U
"Fall Gruen" was not a plan for the occupation of a border area twenty

to thirty kilometers deep; as the documents clearly show, it was a

plan to "sne-sh Czechoslovakia by military action", to prevent the
Czech arny from escaping into Slovakia by forcing it into battle,

and to occupy Bohemia and Moravia as speedily as possible, Leeb's
Twelfth Army and Rundstedt's Second Army were the two largest armies

to be employed in the operation^ and Leeb^s army was to piay a vital
1,
2,

Tr, pp. 2299-2301,
Tr, p, 2301,

B. Tr, pp; 2080-81.
U. Haider, Tr, p. 2080,
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role in smashing Czech resistance.

Its mission is described in a memo-

random of a oonference taken from the "Fall Gruen" documents
Tw^th and Fourteenth Armies will work together. Their
columns must necessarily support one another during the
thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only

weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kilometers.
Operation therefore'promising. After the thrust in a
northerly direction^ Tvfelfth Army forces east and "races"
for Brunn,

The enemy will not be able to employ reserves

according to plan.

In short, "Fall Gruen" v/as a highly aggressive plan and T;as

expressly so described by Haider,2 it was in fact so aggressive,
and so likely to involve Germaiy in conflict "with the western

powers, that most of the leading German generals were violently

opposed to it and, according to Haider, even a military revolU
against Hitler was planned.

The Chief of the German General Staff,

✓

Beck, submitted a memo warning that the execution of "Fall Gruen"
wcruld precipitate a v;orld war.

The German generals did not think

that Germany was prepared for such a v;ar, and Haider testified that

they went to dangerous extremes to forestall such a development,3
Indeed, this very episode is one of the matters chiefly relied upon
by the defense in order to show that the German generals did not

have an aggressive mentality and were opposed to Hitler,

In the

face of this overv/helming evidence, Leebts testimony that "Fall
Gruen" was a mere border operation is an unmitigated misrepresen✓

tation, and his suggestion that there would have been no fighting

even if the Munich agreement had not bean reached is utterly far>tastio.

Leeb also minimized his ovm activities in connection vd-th

"Fall Gruen" in a manner which finds no support in the record.

The

picture he paints of himself at this time as a retired officer, with

1, 388-15, Fcos, Exh, lOiiS, Bk XII, p, 59.
2,

Tr, p, 1868,

3,

I-^ilder, Tr, p, iSijl-liit,
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his mind concentrated on research into family archives and vacations

in the moimtains, who merely "took an interest in these preparations",
v/ill not withstand a moment

reflection in the light of the record*^

Leeb and Haider both testified that Leeb took no part in the mili-

taiy planning of the projected attack,^ but the documents in "Fall
Gruen" and the testimony of Leeb and Haider on cross-examination show

that a special staff viias formed in the summer of 1938 to work out the
plan of operations for the Czech attack in the sector of the Tw^-fth
^

-•

Leeb was, according to his service record, available for ser✓

vice in that very area at tl-at very time, and the special staff v/as

called '^/forking Staff Leeb",

Haider testified that 'n/iforking Staff

Leeb" was similar to "Working Staff Rundstedt" which was formed the

follo7/ing year to plan the attack on Poland,2 A memorandum of 23

May 1939 concerning the formation of 'forking Staff Rundstedt" states :3
•liThe forking Staff Rundstedt* consists for the beginning — similar

to the 'Working Staff Leeb* in Ifunich in 1938 — only of three persons,"

In 1939 the three persons wore Rundstedt, Manstein, and

Blumentritt*

Working Staff Leeb vjas composed of Leeb, ii&nstein,

and Blumentritt^ Manstein was Leeb*s Chief of Staff in the Twelfth

Arn^y, and Blumentrltt was the operations officer, Itestein, as
Leeb Is Chief of Staff, attended a meeting of all the Chiefs of Staff
with Hitler at the Obersalzberg on 10 August 1939 at which the di

vergences of viows between Hitler and the generals concerning the
likelihood of intervention by the western powers, and the weaknesses

of the so-called "West Wall", flared up sensationally,^ Leeb himr.
y

"

self testified that, during August and September, he "continued to
participate in the working out of the preparations of the Twelfth
Array",5

1, Tr, pp, 2077 and 2li36,
2, Haider, Tr, p, 2082-83.,

3, 368—PS,^ Pros, Exh, 10U8,^Ek XII, P» ^9*
U. 1780-PS, Pros. Exh, 103ii, Bk XI, p. I?#.
5«

Tr, p« 2300,

r* Z9 ^
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fMi-i- in I Wj'TiTr-

As a result of th© }Ianioh Agraement, it -was unnecessary to

carry out "Fall Gruen",

Lfieb lad his Army into the Sudetenland

and remained thera until approxmately the middle of Ootober^l
TThen he left actiVe duty*

On the Hth of that month, the OKSft
✓

^

asked all Army headqua±»ters, including Leeh^Sj to report "what
reinforcements are necessary in the present situation in order to

break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?" 2
Leebts testimory concerning the outbreak of the war in Septem

ber 2-939 is equally evasive and meretricious#

He stated that he

was "in retirement" and "did not participate at all'j that, "as a

con:5d.0to surprise to me", he was called to the meeting with Hitler ,
on the Obersalaberg on 22 August 1939? and that from Hitler's re^
marks ho gathered only "the impression tl¥i.t the situation was somo«
...

^

what similar to the situation which prevailed before the invasion of
the Sudetenland and##...that there would be no war".

He says that

he based his conclusion upon Hitler's announcement of the nonr-ag«
✓

•

gression pact about to be concluded with Russia, upon Hitler's
•

.

y

"100^ assurance" that France and England would not intervene, and
Hitler's statement that negotiations with Poland would continue#

He further testified that ho commanded Amy Group C, with the mission

of defending the western front of Germany#3
It is, of course, quite preposterous to imagine that Leob
would have been given such a critical assignment — conm^nd of
/

the entire western front — v;ithout opportunity being afforded

him to acquaint himself with the forces at his disposal, their
y

equipmonb and their resources for defense in general. And, once
y

again, the testimony of the defense witness Haider is quite suf
ficient to demonstrate this absurdity#.

Haider testified tfet an

attack from the west had to be antioipeted as a strong possibility
✓

in the event of a Qeman attack on Poland, that the assignment of

protecting Gemany's western frontier was given to Leeb, and must
1# Tr# p.'

2, 388iS, Pros. Exh. 10l;8, Bk XXX, p. 103.
3.

Tr# pp. 2301-oU.
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i^ve IcnoTim by then "that the possibility of a military operation
in the west existed and was being anticipated and that it was his

duty in suoh a case to protect the West with a minimum of forces".!
The vital nature of Leeb^s role in the West is set forth in a direct

ive for the conduct of the "vvar issued on 31 August 1939^ "viiich

stated!2

The Arny will hold the Siegfried Line (West Wall) and voll
make preparations to prevent its encirclement in the North
by the Western Povfers invading Belgium or Dutch territoiy.
If French forces should enter Luxembourg^ the frontier
bridges may bo blovm up.

Leeb>s "impression" of Hitler^s remarks on the Obersalzberg is

equally implausible.

The noU'-aggression pact with Russia made it

more likely, not less likely, that Hitler would press home his ad«
vantage ruthlessly.

Hitler did indicate a hope that England and

France would not intervene, but he gave no "100^ assurance", and in
fact made it quite clear that he would carry through with his plan
for the destruction of Poland regardless of v;hat the v/estern powers

might do.

So far from expressing ary.belief ttat negotiations vjlth

Poland would lead to a satisfactory solution, he told the generals

Poland is in a position in which I v/anted her.....I am

only afraid that at the last moment some S^hweinehund
vrill make a proposal for mediation.
Hitler also-made clear his aggressive intentions against the
✓

Western povrers, and his cynical contempt for any rudiment of morali-*

ty in international relations!^
It "was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to
coma sooner of later. I had ala^eady made this decision

in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn a«
gainst the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One
cannot dose one*s ayes even before a threatening situa
tion. I v/anted to establish an acceptable relationship
with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But
1.

Tr. p,,209i;*

2. C»^26g, Pros. Exh. 1099, Bk. XXII, p« 207.
3. 798-K, Pros, Exh, 1101, Bk XIII, p. 215.
Idem., p. 213; lOlU^PS, Pros. Esdi. 1102, Bk XIIX, p. 217.
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. this plan which was agreeable to me^ could not be executed,
sinoa essential points have changed.

Everybody shall have to inake a point of it that v^e were '
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.

Struggle for life or death.long period of peaoe would
not do us any good...«.Destruotion of Poland in the^fore
ground.... .Even if war should break out in the West, the
destruction of Poland shall be the primary objectiVG#.i..I

shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the v/ar,
never mind whether it is plausible or not. The victor shall
not be asked, later on, whether vire told the truth or not.
In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters,
but Viotory....«Have no pity. Brutal attitude....,Complete
destruction of Poland is the military aim,.,.,Conviction

that the German Yfehrmaoht is up to the requirements. The
start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.

ks the DfT found, these records of wieit Hitler said to Leeb .and the
other generals show that the final decision for Poland^s destruction .

was reached shortly before 22 August 1939, that a conflict between
Germany and the west was unavoidable in the long run, and that al
though Hitler hoped to be able to avoid a snmltaneous conflict v/ith
✓

Great Britain and France, he fully realized that there was a risk of

this happening but it was a risk which he -was willing to take.l
In the last analysis, the best tY&t can be made out of Leebis

story is that he believed that, if Poland yielded to German demands,
there v/ould have been no v/ar: "If the Polish Corridor question vrould

have been solved in a ne-nner tolerable for us, then no v;ar would have

resulted",^ H^der put it in much the same fashion^ according to him
the preparations for the invasion of Poland "represented a military
means of pressure in order to support his political aiins".3 But even
Haider admitted that the generals "had some reason to believe that

Hitlerts intentions were aggressive",^ and, in any event, the hope
that Poland might succumb to the threat of force without actual fight
ing is no excuse. This was held by the D.ff very squarely with respect
to the defendant Raedert^
The defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor von

Fritsoh, nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually
1. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p, 202,
2.
3.

Tr. p,-2ia+8.
Haider, Tr. p. 2090-.91.

It,

Tr. p,'.2089.

5. Vol. I, Trial of the Ifejor War Criminals, p. 191^92^
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meant -war, a conviction v/hioh the defendant Raeder claims
that he held up to 22 August 1939* The basis of this con
viction 7/as his hope that Hitler v/ould obtain a "political
solution" of Gerinany's problems. But all that this means,

when examined, is the belief that Germai^ts position v;ould
be so good, and Germanyis armed might so overvfhelming that
the territory desired could be obtained without fighting for
it. It must be remembered too that Hitler^s declared in
tention Y>rith regard to Austria was actually carried out
TJlthin a little over four montlis from the date of the meet

ing, and within less than a year the first portion of Czecho
slovakia Yijas absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months
later. If any doubts had existed in the minds of ary of his
hearers in November 1937, after I^rch 1939 there could no
longer be any question that Hitler i^as in deadly earnest in
his decision to resort to v/ar.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that Leeb in his direct
testimony did not discuss the occupation of Bohemia and Moi^vla in

March 1939^ v/hen asked on cross-examination whether he did not regard
the events of Itoch 1939 as a breach of the Munich lact, he replied

that he "lived in retirement at that tine and kept away from all poli**

tics, therefore I did not ponder this question".
t

This from a man who

^

had himself led the march into the Sudetenland, who was subject to re—
call in the event of war as one of Germany's greatest military leaders,

and who professes to be deeply interested in questions of morality,
A final vrord should be said v^ith respect to the fact that Leeb's

forces were deployed along the western frontier, and were not ongagod

on Polish territory.

His counsel has laid great stress upon this cir-

cumstanoG,^ but in fact it does not touch the issues.. Leeb knew at
this time that the attack upon Poland was aggressive,2 and it is ob
vious that Hundstedt and Book oculd not have attacked in Poland withf

out Leeb Is holding action in the West,

In this respect, ,Leeb*s posi

tion was exactly analagous to tl:»t of a baiic robber who stands guard
at the door to fend off interference by the police while his confod03>-

ates rob the bank.

It is well settled that such a person is criminally

liable ag a principal^ as has been stated in a leading tescb
on criminal law:^

1, Opening statement of Dr. Latenisor, pp. 33—3U. .
2,

Tr,. p,,21^49,

3, Vol. I, Whartonis Grbninal Law (12th Ed.), p. 311.
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No matter how wide may be the separation of confederates,

if they afe all engaged in a common plan for the execution
of felony, and all take their parts in the furtherance of
a common design, all are liable as principals.

Furthermore, Leeb>s position in the Vfest v/as, fundamentally, no dif
ferent from that of Doenitz,

German submarine warfare v/as almost

exclusively directed against England and France, and played no part,
-

/

•'

or at most a very insignificant part, in the fighting with Poland,
but this did not prevent the HIT from convicting Doenitz of committing

crimes against peace at the very outset of the v;ar:l
If

Submarine iTarfare wliich began iimnediately upon the outbreak

of ^Tar, was fully coordinated vdth the other branches of the

Wehrmacht, It is clear that his U-boats, jfev; in number at
the time, were fully prepared to wage "ivar#
The evidence v/ith respect to Leeb's responsibility for the ag-

gressive wars in the Y/est in the spring of Ipli-O is, if anything, even
more conclusive than in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland,

The

extent to vdiich Leeb>s testimony concerning the western campaign can

be relied on is illustrated by the following collbquy betvfeen Leeb
and his counsel on direct eD^aminationi^

Q Fieldraarshal^ before the Polish campaign, did ary plans
of a campaign against France exist?

A

I don't know that because I yjas retired then,

Q Yl:^t was the situation after the Polish campaign?

A I don't knovf that either because I was in no iway a
participant,,4,,

Q leren't you present during any discussions and confer
ences concerning the western campaign?
✓

A No,

I received orders concerning my Army Group, and I

passed these orders on and transmitted them to the armies

under rry comniand as orders of the Amy Group,

In fact, of coxirso, Loeb commanded one of the three Amy Groups on the

western front, and during the campaign he broke through the L^ginot Line,
captured an entire French Amy Group, and advanced deep into France,^
Ho en^ged in numercus discussions and conferences concerning the west

ern campaign of which the folloiying — a conference on 27 March, 19[tO

VoJ# If TiPiaX of the Major Yfar Criiiiinals, p, 310
2. Tr. p. 2307.
'
'
3» fTt p. 2319,

3h

•vri.th Hitler^ 3rauchitsch, Haider^ and Loeb^s subordinate cconmanders^

Witaloben and DoHiaann
1)

is but one exampleJ^

Generaloberst von Leeb talks on:
a) General situation. Tactical doctrine of Prencii
and German troops.

b)

Construction of fortifications^ Yj-ith special em«
phasis on fact tl»t steel must not be stinted at
the vreak spots on both sides of Saarbruecken.
Fuehrer interjected here that his desire to have
the main battle position on the commanding ridges
on the southern banlc of the Saar river Yjas frus

trated only by the out-break of the vmr.

c)

Diversionary attack "Golb".

Here the assertion

is made that diversionary attacks must not be
initiated on the Rhine front because of the sub

sequent attack at the Upper Rhine. Closing of
Swiss border iS discussed* Oi'fing to coal ship
ments to Italy, the border cannot be '-closed be
fore the actual start of the attack,....

2)

Generaloberst von Witzleben talks on Operation "Gelb".
Report is accepted without discussion. In the subset
quent discussion on construction of fortifications^ the'
Fuehrer lays great stress on Artillery soiplacements,....

3)

Gen^'Dollmann speaks briefly on situation at Seventh
Arny^ stressing its deficiencies. Outlines three cross
ing operations vfithin Operation "Gelb".....

ti)

After ttet, the Fuehrer speaks about the general situat xon.....

In shortj Leeb participated at _the highest level in the plannii^

of aggressivs ivar in the Y/est, and Twas one of the three chief execu
tors of the aggressive plans.

There is no issue as to knoYfledge;

Leeb adiTiits that he knew of Hitler*s aggressive intentions,^ and he
attended the meeting between Hitler and the military leaders on 23

November 1939 at Y/hich Hitler declared:^
I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and

quickest moment.

Breach of tho neutrality of Belgium and

Holland is meaningless,

No one Yri.ll question that Y/hen we

havd Y/on«

Leeb has put forth two defenses.

The first is that he joined

with the other German generals in opposing Hitler's plan to atitjaok in

the West iiiiTiiediately after the Polish canipalgn in the fall of 1939.

1. NOKST-31UO, Pros. Exh. 13^9, Bk. XXX, p. 15-6,
2.
3.

Tr, p., 2311^2.
Vol. Ij Trial of the J.fejor iWar Criminals, p. 210.
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This is quite true^ and the record contains a memorandum which Leoh
submitted to Brauchitsch in October 1939 urging that it would be

Yd^er for Germany to pursue a Y/aiting policy^ and pointing out the
undesirable political re'percussions vfhich a violation of the neutral

ity of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg Y/ould entail.-^ But all of this
is no defense whatsoever.
^

The aggressive ivars in the Yfest Y/ere in

^

^

fact planned, prepared, and ivaged, and Leeb did in fact knavd.ngly par
ticipate,

Before the U.®, the defendants ICeitel and Raeder both

raised a similar "defense of opposition", but the B?r rightly dis-

allovYed it,^ indeed, in a deeper sense Leebis memorandum to Branchitsch aggravates his guilt, for it shows that he clearly realized that
a violation of the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg

would be looked upon v/ith horror by all neutral states.

In the oase of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, Leeb makes the

further defense that his troops did not invade those countries, since

his entire campaign was fought in Franco,

This contention, analagous

to the contention tl^t Leeb^s' troops Y/ore never actually on Polish

sodl, is also stressed by his counsel.

The answer, of course, is the

same as in the case of the contention about Poland,

Leeb well knew

that the entire design and plan of campaign in the West v/as to over
run the IiOYf Countries and smash the French and British armies.
✓

He

^

confederated Y/ith Bock, Rundstedt and others, and is just as liable
for the criminal attacks on Belgiuiu and Holland as are Bock and Rand?'
stedt themselves

In such caseS of confederacy, all are'responsible for the

acts of each, if done in pursuance of, or as incidental to,
the common design.

Leeb Is crijuinal rGsponsibility for the invasion of the Soviet

Union need not detain us longj the evidence is overwhelming and his
1,

Loeb Document Bk III, p, 65.

2, Vol, I, Trial of the Major Vfar Criminals, pp, 289, 316,
3* Vol, I, Wharton's Criminal Law, fl2th Ed,), p, Sliii.,
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attempts at explanation are quito unconvincing.

Once again, he com- -

manded one of the tliree Army Crroups involved in the attack, and led
his forces north from IBast Pnissia to Leningrad,

The record is replete

with the evidence of his leading role in planning and executing the
✓

invasion, and will bo sot forth in detail in our brief,

Leeb defended

his participation on the ground that he ivas mentally opposed to the
attacks, but there is no evidence that his "opposition" ever took ar^

overt form and, in any event, for reasons already stated, his mental
reservations do not constitute a defense,

Leeb's_ only other defense

is related to tho question of knowledge. He attended the conferenoe

betv/een the military leaders and Hitler in March 19^41 when Hitler artnounced his definite intention to attaclc Russia, and, according to

Leeb, the burden of Hitler's argumont ivas that Russia was about to
attack Geniiany, and that in self-defense Gem^ny would have to launch

a so-called "preventive v,/ar",^
The argumenb that the German attack on the Soviet Union vjas
launched in "self-defense" was also raised before the BE, and wa^

rightly rejected.

Since the time of the Bfl? Judgment, additional

evidence presented in this case has abfu.ndantly reinforced the IMT*s
conclusion.

It clearly appears, from the Haider Diary and other

documents, tiB.t Hitler decided to attack Russia for two prima^ reas-

onss firstly, in accordance with his long—cherished objective, ex

pounded in Mein Kampf and in his speeches, to win "lebensraum" in the
East and exploit the natural resources of the Soviet Union, such as

grain and oil. Secondly, Hitler was reluctant to undertake militaiy

operations across the channel against England, and concluded that
En^and "^vas holding out and refusing to make peace largely in the hope
that Russia would come to her assistance*

The attack against Russia

was, in Hitler's mind, in large part a means to bring England to her
knees. As early as July 19U0, Haider quoted Hitler to ^he effect that
"With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would be gone, Germany then
1,

Tr. p. 2328,
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•would be master of Europe and the Ballcana,"^ Leeb's testimoriy that

Hitler represented the vw against the So-vlet Union as a "preventive
•war" finds absolutely no basis in the record*

Army Group and

Leeb and the other

Commanders-inGChief were present at a meeting vri-th

Hitler on lU June 19iil> shortly before the Russian can^jaign T/as launched,
p

and Haider suranarized HitlerJs discourse as follows:*^

After lunch, comprehensive political speech by the Euolirer,
in v;hich he gives the reasons for his intention to attack
Russia and develops his calculations that Russians disinte

gration will induce Britain to give up the struggle*
The other goal of destroying the Russian §tate and exploiting

the resources of the Soviet Union yjas also clearly revealed to Leeb and
✓

the other military leaders* At the meeting of 30 March 19£ll,, relied on
✓

by Leeb, Hitler did not say anything about a preventive "war, but on the
contrary made clear the far—reaching objectives of the Russian campaign*

Leeb and the other generals were expressly told a-b this meeting tl^t
the destruction of the State and the oxbemoination of the intelligensia

was part of their task. As Haider put it in his Diary:3 "Our goalis'in '
✓

Russia: crush armed forces, bread up state#••••The indi"vddual troop com
manders must know the issues at stake.

They must be leaders in the fight."

The organization and objectives of the elaborate German machinery for the
economonic exploitation of Soviet territory, set up -under Rosenbergis
leadership, wore also well known to the military leaders*
There is not a shred of o-vLdence in the contemporary documents to

support LeobJs defense that the Soviet campaign-was represented to the

Geri^n generals as a "preventive war". As the 11.0? founds^
It v/as contended for the defendants that the attack upon the

U*S*S#R# was justified because'the So-vlot Union-was contem

plating an attack upon Gennany, and making preparations to
tliat end*

It is impossible to believe that this view was

ever honestly entertained#

- •

>

The plans for the economic exploitation'of the U#S#S#R#, for
the removal of masses of the population, for the murder of
Commissars and political loaders,.vrore all part of the caro-

fuUy prepared scheme launched on 22 tAine without i/arning of
any kind, and v/ithout the shadow of legal excuse# It wag
plain aggression#

1,

NOICI 3lU0, "Pros. E3di,,.13^9,.Bk XIX, p#., 22, .

2.

Idem#, p.'37..

3# HCK.T 3llt0, Proa. Exh^. 1359, Ek XEC, pp« Jl, 33#

Vol. I, Trial of the rl^jor VJar Criminals, p# 2l5,
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2,

Schniewind

In turning from Leeb to Schniewind, we not only turn from the Arny

to the Navy, but also from the highest level of planning and execution in
the field to planning and execution at "Navy Department level"»

Schniewind

became Chief of a bureau in the OKM in October 1937 > and was fully informed
concerning naval Eearmament#

He became Chief of Staff of the Naval War

Staff about the time of Munich, was generalHy informed concerning "Pall

Gruen", and received the directives issued in anticipation of the occupation

of Bohemia and Moravia.^ But the principal charges against Schniewind
under the indictment relates to the aggressive wars against Poland, the
Western powers and the Low Countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, the Soviet
Union and, in particular, Denmark and Norway. , The evidence against Schnievrind parallels very closely the evidence which led to the conviction of
Raeder by the IMT.

In convicting Raeder of the commission of crimes against peace in
connection with the outbreak of war with Poland, France, and the United
Kingdom, the IMT stated;

2

received.••♦the directives

"Raeder

of 'Fall

Weiss' beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the Navy
to support the Army by intervention from the sea.

He was also one of the

few chief leaders present at the meeting of 23 May 1939*

Obersalaberg briefing of-22 August 1939«"

He attended the

Schniewind likewise received

the directives on "Fall Weiss" and was present at the well-known meetings

with Hitler on 23 May and 22 August 1939*^ Furthermore, the record in
this case contains many documents showing Schniewind's direct and constant
participation in naval preparations for war with Poland and the western

powers#

Schniewind's only defense is the same contention that was made on

behalf of Raeder and Leeb, namely, that he thought Poland might yield to
German demands without fighting; this defense vras rejected by the IMP, and
has already been discussed in our analysis of the evidence against Leeb.

With respect to Raeder's responsibility for the invasion of Denmark
and Norway, the IMT judgment states

1,

Tr, pp. ii9U0-Ul.

2,

Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 3l9»

3»

Tr. pp. U820-i47.

Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 315-16.
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Admiral Karls originally suggested to Raeder the desirable

aspects of bases in Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October
1939, which sought comments on the desirability of such bases,
was circulated ;vithin SKL.

-On 10 October Raeder discussed

the matter with Hitler; his War Diary entry for that day says
Hitler intended to give the matter consideration. A few months
later Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl; OKVT

began its planning and the Naval YiTa^ Staff worked with OKW staff
officers.

Raeder received Keitel's directive for Norway on

27 January 19U0 and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed
by %tler.

The evidence against Schniewind is substantially the same.

Admral Ka^ls*

original suggestion was embodied in a letter to Raeder, and Raeder turned
this letter over to Schniewind "to investigate the military angles of the

problem" and make appropriate recommendations.^ Schniewind was not present
at Raeder*s discussions with Hitler, Quisling, Keitel and Jodl, but was

kept fully informed of the tenor of these discussions by Raeder,.

2

Schnie-

(

wind made a second "exhaustive study about the whole Norwegian problem"

at the end of 1939 or the beginning of 19iiO, which "was transmitted to

the OKW."^ When the Special Working Staff to develop the operational
plans was set up, the Navy v/as represented by Captain Krancke, and Sch
niewind saw to it that the SKL furnished Krancke with all necessary inform

ation on the naval aspects of the proposed operation.^ Schniewind, like
Raeder, received the first operational directive, covering the invasion

and occupation of both Denmark and Norway, early in March, 19i;0,^ and
thereafter "the SKL gave the corresponding directive to the subordinate
6

agencies of the Navy".

Schniewind, like Raeder and the other defendants before the IMT,
defends the occupation of Norway on the ground that it was a "preventive
7

measure" to forestall a British occupation,

despite the fact that the

entries in the Navy War Diary in October 1939 contain no indication whatg

soever that fear of a British move was a factor at that time.

tention was fully considered and rejected by the IMT.

9

This con-

Furthermore,

whatever might be said in this regard with respect to the occupation of

1.
2.
3.
U.

6.
7.
8.

Tr.
Tr.
Tr.
Tr.
Tr.
Tr.
Tr.

pp. U852-53i
pp. U857-58.
pp. U860-61.
p. ii.862,
pp. i486^-67«
p. U868.
p. I4872.

Tr. p. 14853.

9. Vol. I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, pp. 206-209,, 316,
-iiO-

X.

Norway, Schniewind admitted here, in reply to a question by Judge Hale^
concerning the occupation of Denmark, that "even today, I do not know any
international law justification for this mattery.

1

As the IMT stated:

2

No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any
plan by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Den
mark.

No excuse for that aggression has ever been offered.

In the course of its opinion convicting Raeder on the charge of
crimes against peace, the IMT further stated;

3

Raeder received the directives, including the inniunerable

postponements, for the attack in the West.

In a meeting

of 18 March 19i;l with Hitler, he urged the occupation of
all Greece,

He claims this was only after the British

had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack, and points
out the Navy had no interest in Greece,
Hitler's directive on Yugoslavia.

He received

Schniewind likewise received the directive in connection with the attack
in the West, and the SKL issued appropriate orders to the suboirdinate naval

agencies to support the- Army by occupying certain Dutch islands and by

laying mines to block off the Dutch coast,^ He attended the meeting of the
military leaders with FH.tler on 23 November 1939^ at which Hitler declared
that he would attack France through Belgium and Holland and that a "breach

of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless.
ion that when we have won",

No one will quest

Schniewind received the directives of December

19hO for the invasion of Greece, and of 27 March 19^0 for the occupation
of Yugoslavia; German naval units accompanied the krmy into Greece to deal

with shipping matters in the Greek ports.^
As the IMT found, Raeder opposed Hitler's plan to invade the Soviet

Union, and endeavored to persuade Hitler to change his mind.

7

There is

no reason to doubt Schniewind's testimony that he shared Raeder's views,®
But Schniewind, like Raeder, i-eceived the "Barbarossa" directives, and
the Navy took the"necGssary preparatory measures n ?

1.
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3.

Lehmann

The defendant Lehmann was the director of the Legal Department of

the OKW from the summer of 1938 until the end of the war; in 19Ui he was
given the military rank of Generaloberstabsrichter,

Although he had no

strategic or tactical responsibilities, the record clearly shows that he
was well informed in advance concerning the Wehrmacht's war plans in order

that he might take whatever preparatory measures were necessary in the
legal field.

Thus, when preparations for the attack on Poland were being

made, Lehmann received a copy of a decree dated 3 April 1939> issued by

Warlimont's office, on the subject of "Command Authority in the Operational

Zone of the Arny",^ The purpose of this decree was to define the author
ity of the various governmental agencies, both military and civilian,
which would be carrying on activities in the operational zone, ' Similarly,
only two days after Hitler decided to invade Yugoslavia and a week before

the invasion actually began, Lehmann received a decree signed by Keitel
.

entitled "Special Instructions Concerning Directive No. 25"«

2

.

Directive

No. 2$ was the document in which Hitler had first announced that Yugoslavia had to be "smashed as rapidly as possible".

3

The Keitel decree

received by Lehmann stated that "The Yugoslavian territory to be occupied
by German troops in the course of the operation will be treated as an

operational area of the Army".

The German rules for court martial pro

cedure subjected all foreigners and Germans in the operational zone to

court martial Jurisdiction for offenses committed there,^ It is clear
that the Keitel decree was sent to Lehmann so that he would be advised

in advance that he could expect a good deal of new business in his Legal

Department as a result pf the Yugoslavian campaign, and so that he could
prepare himself to take'care of it.

He was being asked to do in his own

sphere exactly what the field commanders were being asked to do in theirs —
to take whatever steps were necessary in order to carry out the aggressive
war against Yugoslavia.

1.

0120, Pros. Exh. 1079, Bk XIII, p. 8^.

2.

ITUO-PS, Pros. Exh. 1180, Bk XVI, p. U3.

3.
l^.

C127, Pros. Exh. 1187, Bk XVI, p. 72,
Lehmann Doc, Bk II, p. 11,
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Lebmann was up to his ears in preparing for the invasion of Russia.
He said that Keitel told him in March that "there was a possibility of

a war with Russia".-

On March 30th, Hitler announced at a conference

with the military leaders that commissars would be liquidated after cap-

tu^in the forthcoming Russian campaignT^d" also that neither soldiers '
who committed offenses against indigenous civilians nor civilians who had

conmitted crimes against Wehrmacht personnel would be tried by court mar
tial. Shortly after this, according to Lehmann, he received a telephone
call from Keitel's office and was told to write a draft of an order putting
the latter intention into effect. This was the beginning of the infamous
Barbarossa Jurisdiction order. Lehmann worked on this during most of the
month of April.

He conferred with

Jodl, Warlimont and Mueller and

finally produced a version which was acceptable to Hitler. During this
same period, he received the om draft of the Commissar Order and made
some changes in that,

Lehmann turned out his third draft of the Barbarossa

Jurisdiction order on April 28th and he had talked to Keitel and Jodl
about the Commissar Order earlier than that.

Lehmann knew that Russia

was shortly to be invaded, he knew that the German occupation of Russia

was to be characterized by practices prescribed by the OKIV which flagrantly
violated international law, and he worked with might and main for three
months before the campaign began to concoct the prescriptions.

The foregoing are merely samples of the type of activity in which
Lehmaxm was engaged in preparing for aggressive wars.

The prosecution

suggests that the case against Lehmann under Coionts One and Four is almost
exactly analagous to the case which was established against Funk before

the IMT.

Funk, for example, was convicted of making economic preparations

for the aggressive war against the Soviet Union by making plans for the
economic exploitation of the occupied Soviet territory and by planning for
the printing of ruble notes in Germany in order to serve as occupation
currency.

Lehmann's activities in the legal field exactly paralleled Funk*s

in the economic field.

Neither Funk nor Lehmann was a leading figure in

the origination of aggressive war plans, but each took a substantial part
in his own field.

1.
2.

Tr. pp„ 7952-96.
Tr. p. 806U.

G. SuMnary

We believe that^ by dealing vath the proof under Counts One and Four
concerning Leeb, Schniewind, and Lehmann, we have met and disposed of all
the defenses which have been raised under these counts.

For the most part^

the pattern of defense has changed very little from defendant to defendant,
Thusj the defendant Kuechler more or less parrotted Leeb's highly implau
sible description of the meeting with Hitler of 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg,

Kuechler, indeed, quite outdid his former Commander-in-Chief by

advancing the preposterous suggestion that the non-aggression pact between

Germany and Russia made a war between Germany and Poland very improbable
"because it did not seem to me that it was possible for us to conclude a

treaty with Russia and a few days thereafter attack a state which was on

more or less friendly terms with Russia".^ Just as Leeb claims that he
"did not ponder" the moral or legal significance of the German occupation

of Bohemia and Moravia, so Kuechler brushes it aside as "a political measure and it was outside my scope to judge it".

During the western offen

sive, Kuechler's Eighteenth Army smashed through Belgium and Holland and
ultimately captured Paris.

When asked on cross-examination whether he

could justify the violation of the neutrality of the Low Countries, he
3

could on]^ reply:'

It was a political measure which I really didn*t think about
at all, I really don't know what I thought about it then.
,,,,,,I think in a political connection, I really didn't
think about i t at all.

Such testimony reveals a brazen indifference to the life, liberty, and
well-being of entire nations that is almost as repellent as the very acts

with which thesa men arc charged.

It is exasperating even to spend time

commenting on statements such as these.

Certainly Leeb did not consider

this wanton, outrageous and murderous attack on peaceful hnd harmless neigh
boring countries a "political matter outside his scope" when he sent his
. h
memorandum to Brauchitsch in October 1939, and iwrote therein:

1,
2,

Tr, ?• 2801,
Tr, p, 219$.

3,

Tr. p, 29hh.

ii.

Leeb Doc, Bk, III, pp, 70-71,

t
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One cannot help thinking that England and France are
actually waiting for us to do them a favor by attacking,
or even violating, Belgian's and Holland's neutrality. •
The fact that the French took no action whatsoever in
the face of the initial massing of Army Group B form

ations - although they must have known it for a long

time —proves how much they would welcome such an attack.
Such an attack would provide England and France immediately
with the one thing they haven't got up to now, i.e., a force

ful propaganda slogan, and this would even be the best one
imaginable: to defend the Fatherland — even if it is only
the Belgian one I No Frenchman will fail to yield to such

a slogan; everyone will fight for the homeland as soon as it
appears to be threatened by the penetration of German troops
into Belgium*

The British warmongers would like nothing better than our
attack which would give them an excellent excuse to brand us
as the instigators of uni-eat in Europe. More than ever
before will they demand that this instigator be destroyed -

and they will be heeded, to be sure I
•js-

^

^

Any violation of Belgium's neutrality is bound to drive that
country into the arms of France.
have one common foe:

France and Belgium will then

Germany, which for the second time with

in 25 years, assaults neutral Belgium I Germany, whose govern
ment solemnly vouched for and promised the preservation of

and respect for this neutrality only a few weeks ago !

If Germany, by forcing the issue, should violate the neutral
ity of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, a neutrality which
has been solemnly recognized and vouched for by the German

government, this action will necessarily cause even those
neutral states to reverse their declared policy towards the

Reich, which up till now showed some measure of sympathy
for the German cause.

This document is a tribute to Leeb's intelligence but, in the light of

subsequent events, it can hardly serve as a testimonial to his character.
Rather it is an indictment, not only of Leeb, but of nearly every defen
dant in the dock.

It conclusively establishes that these men knew that

what they did was wrong.

There is, we suggest, no document in the entire

record which is more damning.

I'isf'J

WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITT:
COUNTS TiVO AND THREE

The evidence which the prosecution has submitted in support of the
charges in Count Two and Three of the indictment is very extensive.

We

shall not attempt today to'describe again the terrible events which the

documentary evidence so eloquently portrays.

The criminal responsibility

of each defendant under Counts Two and Three iirill be established in detail
in the individual briefs.

At this time we will content ourselves with

calling to the Tribunal's attention only such portions of the evidence as

are relevant to meet the conglomerations of vague, implausible, and mut
ually contradictory defenses Virhich have been raised under these counts*
A.

The "Commissar" Order

Under subdivision A of Count Two of the indidmient, dealing with the

so-called "Commissar Order", Sperrle and Schniewind are not charged. The •

responsibility of Warlimont and Lehmann in connection with the drafting

and distribution of the order, as well as the responsibility of Reinecke

for the execution of the order at prisoner of war camps has, we submit,
been clearly established. The remaining eight defendants ~ Leeb, Kuechler,
Hoth, Reinhardt, S^lniuth, Hollidt, Roques, and Woehler — are all charged
with the distribution and execution of the Commissar Order in their capa
cities as field commanders. All of them have, resorted to substantially
identical excuses and explanations. Once again, we think that these de

fenses can be discussed most expeditiously and clearly by examining the
evidence with respect to a few individual defendants, and for this purpose
we will deal with Leeb, Kuechler and Hoth.

1,

I^eb

None of the defendants, including the defendant Leeb, denied the

unlawful character of the Commissar Order,^ Nor does Leeb deny that it
was distributed within his Arn^r Group.

On the witness stand, he defended

his conduct with respect to the Commissar Order by testimony to the effects

1.

Tr, p, 23ii6.
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a*

that he protested against the issuance of the Commissar

Order to Brauchitsch and Keitel;^
b®

that he did not himself pass down the Commissar Order to
the Fiftieth Corps or the Army Group Rear Area, which

were directly subordinated to him|^
c#

that the Commissar Order was transmitted by OKH directly
to the three Armies under his command — the Sixteenth

Army, the Eighteenth Army, and Panzer Group i;, which was

the equivalent of an Army —^ and that he had no authority
to prevent the further passing down of the Order by the
three Armies

d®

that he gave oral directions to the units subordinate to
him that the Order was not to be carried out, and there
after "hoped that i t v/ould not be carried out to its full

measure"!^
e*

that he was never informed of the reports submitted by his
subordinate units showing that the Order was being carried

out;^

f®

that the reports of commissar shootings in the record in
this case only cover a small percentage of all the
coiffiiiissars, and therefore the prder must not have been
carried out in most instances

g®

that many, if not all, of the reports of commissar shootings

were deliberately falsifiedj'^ and
h®

that many of the commissars reported as shot were in fact
killed in battle®

The prosecution suggests that these so-called "defenses" are miserable

fabrications, and that the record proves incontrovertibly that the Commiss
ar Order was distributed and carried out rd-thin Leeb's Amiy Group, Tfith

Leeb^s knowledge, and resulted in the outright murder of numerous prisoners
of war®

a.

We will dispose of these defenses seriatim®

The fact that Leeb protested against the Order to Brauchitsch

and Keitel is, of course, no defense if ho in fact distributed and executed
the Order®

Like his memorandum to von Brauchitsch advising against the

invasion of Belgium and Holland, those protests merely establish conclu

sively that ho vfas fully aware of the "vmrongful character of his actions®.

1.
2.
3®^
ii.'
Sm '
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Tr.
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pp® 2350-^2®
p® 2361®

6® Tr® pp® 235U-56®
7® Tr® p® 2359.
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b»

Vifhether or not Leeb personally passed the Commissar Order to

the commander of his Reaf Area^ it is perfectly clear that the Order

reached the Rear Area^ because on 19 December 19Ul^ the 28lst Security
Division, then subordinated to the Rear Area, reported that two commissars

had been shot»^ The headquarters of Leeb^s krmy Group North was the only
headquarters which could have re-issued the Commissar Order to the Rear
2

Area»

The Fiftieth Corps also reported shootings of commissars#

leeb

sought to explain this on the ground that the Fiftieth Corps was, for a
time, subordinated to the Sixteenth Army, and that the Sixteenth Army
may have passed the Commissar Qcder to the Fiftieth Corps at that time#

Whether Leeb himself passed the Order to the Fiftieth Corps, or whether,
knowing that the Sixteenth Army would pass the Order to them he took no
action to prevent this, seems to the prosecution a totally academic question#

c#

Generals Busch, Hoeppner, and the defendant Kuechler, who command

ed the three Armies under Leeb^s Army Group, were directly subordinate to
leeb in the chain of command#

Leeb testified that all three of them shared

his own view that the Commissar Order was unlawful©^ Leeb could have in
structed them not to pass it down, and there is absolutely no basis in the
record for assuming that the three Generals would not have followed his
instructions#

If we are to believe Leeb^s testimony that he himself did

not pass the Order to the Fiftieth Corps and the Rear Area, we must also
conclude that Busch, Hoeppner and Kuechler could have behaved in the same

fashion# But there is no evidence in the record that Leeb made ary attempt
to prevent the army commanders from disseminating the Order#

In fact, the record clearly establishes that Leeb^s Army Group head
quarters issued directives to the subordinate Armies in connection vrith

the execution of the Commissar Order#

Leeb's own Chief of Staff signed

and distributed to the Armies and the Rear Area an order dated 2 July 19ij.l,
directing them to destroy all copies of the Commissar Order, and to re
frain from shooting commissars who had previously escaped detection and

JOKVT 215U, Pros, Exh, 27^, Bk 6CD, p# 9#

lOKVf 2179, Pros. Exh# 61;, Bk III, p, 773 NOKW 2207, Pros# Exh, 89
^k III, p, U43#
'
'r# .pp# 2360-61#

'r# p# 23^1#

were working in labor detachments v^ith other prisoners.

Another document

shows that Leeb's Ic Officer, Jessel, who testified in this proceeding,
directed the lo Officer of Kuechlerts Eighteenth Arir^r to screen prisoner

collection points for commissars who had escaped detection by removing
their insignia,

d,

2

"While there is no reason to doubt Leeb's testimony that he dis

approved of the Commissar Order, there is absolutely no evidence that he
took any action which was effective, or could have been e^^ected to be

effective, to prevent its execution within his Army Group.

leeb, like

almost all other German generals who have been charged with or questioned

concerning their part in the Commissar Order, claims that he gave oral in
structions that it should be disregarded.

But since the documents in the

record clearly establish that numerous commissars were shot by units xmder

Army Group North pursuant to the Orderj it is clear that either leeb gave
no such oral instructions or that they were totally ineffective,

e,

Leeb Is testimony that he did not learn of the reports concerning

the shootings of commissars pursuant to the Order is totally incredible*
If we ch-e to believe Leab's statements that he repeatedly protested against

the Order to von Brauchitsch and Keitel, that he expressed his views to

the subordinate army commanders, and that upon other occasions at the front

he expressed his disapproval of the Order and made inquiries concerning

its effect,^ then it stands to reason that the staff of the Army Group
must have loiovm that leeb was deeply concerned about the Order and would

siu-ely have brought to his attention the reports showing that it was being
executed in spite of his own oral instructions*

But, in any event, as
u

was rightly held by Tribunal V in the "Hostage" casei

An army coiranander will not ordinarily be pemitted to dea:y
knowledge of reports received at his headquarters, they being
sent there for his special benefit* Neither will he ordinarily

be permitted to deny knowledge of happenings v/ithin the area
of his command while he is present therein# It would strain
the credulity of the tribune.l to believe that a high—ranking
militaiy commander would permit himself to get out of touch
with current happenings in the area of his ccaranand during
war time*.

1. NOKW 3136, Pros* .Ebch* ,15U7, Bk XKxI> p* 3U*....
2, NOKVf 31U5, Pros.,Exh*. 1553^ Bk XXII, p* 57«,
3* Tr. pp# 2351"52,
U* United States v* List, et al*,. (Gas© No* 7), Tr, p, lOUol* .
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f*

leeb^s argument concerning the percentage of captured ccimnissars

covered by the reports of shootings is an especially weird fabrication*
He testified that two of the Armies under him — the Sixteenth and the

Eighteenth — captured over 200^000 prisoners, estimated that, for 200,
000 Russian prisoners there should have been 2,000 to 2,^00 commissars,
and contrasted this figure with the 96 comjfiissars covered by the reports

of shootings*^ From this, he concludes that the Gonimissar Order was
carried out only occasionally.

It is true that, in the setting of this case

vrith millions of

Jews being slaughtered and hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners

dying of exhaustion and starvation

the figure 96 does not loon very

large. But the suggestion that responsibility for 96 murders is some
thing to be passed over lightly is, we submit, monstrous.

Furthermore,

Leeb's elaborate and speculative calculations are shown to be entirely

without foundation by the very evidence which the defense siiDmitted,

By

no means all of the commissars who had been fighting with the 200,000
prisoners were captured alive; mar^ of them were killed in action.

The

defense witness Gersdorff testified that mai^ commissars committed suicide

rather than suffer captiure.

2

He also testified that the Commissar Order

became knovfn on the Russian side,

3

and that thereafter most of the comm

issars removed their insignia in an effort to avoid detection,^ and were
not recognized as comriiissars by the troops.

This testimony is confirmed

by the entry in Halder*s diary for 1 August 19h1f which reads5^ "Treat
ment of captured political commissars (most of them are not detected be
fore arrival in Hf camps)".

Considering that commissars were being Icilled

in battle, committing suicide, and disguising their Identity, and that no
doubt the prosecution's collection of reports of commissar shootings is

far from complete, Leeb's calculations are seen to be v/orthless4
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Y'Jhen desperately pressed^ men are often driven to inconsistencies,
and Leeb^s testimony that the reports of commissar shootings were false

reports is a good example of just such an inconsistency.

He suggested

that the reports were concocted in order to cover up the non—execution of
the Commissar Order, by lulling the higher authorities into the belief that

it was being carried out«^ Yet, only a few minutes before he had argued
vehemently that the reports of his Sixteenth Army, which covered the shoot

ing of only seventeen commissars out of an estimated 1,200 to 1,500 cap
tured, "reveal of necessity that the order on the whole was not carried

out,"^ If these reports show so clearly that the Commissar Order was not
being carried out, it is impossible to believe that they were fabricated
for the purpose of deluding someone into thinking that it was being carried

out.

Surely, in fabricated reports, the number of commissars reported

executed would have been set high enough to carry conviction, rather than

so low as to suggest the probability of general disobedience®

It is abundantly clear, in short, that the reports of commissar exe
cution are not "faked", but are entirely trustworthy reports of commissars
executed®

That are "faked" are not these reports but both of Leeb*s de

fenses with respect to percentages (f») and fabricated reports (g®)| these
defenses are not only spurious but mutually inconsistent,

h,

Leeb's final contention is that the reports do not show commissar

esfficutions, but only commisBars killed in battle. These reports, chameleo]n»like, now have three natures, each inconsistent with the other two# This
latest guise is particularly transparent, and is disproved by the very
wording of the reports. Thus, many of them carefully distinguish between

cormnissars "shot" (erschossen) and "killed in action" (gefallen).

27 September 19Ul, the XXVIII Corps of Kucchler's Army reported:

On

u

On 25 September, the Battalion Commissar Kanajew (110th
Railway Protection Regiment of the 2nd NKWB Division) was
found asleep on the bank of the Tossna near the mouth of
this river. He was taken prisoner and shot after a thorough
interrogation#

1,
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1

other reports by the same Corps stated:

On 18 and 19 September, troop operations were carried out
in the woods of Novo Lissino by the Corps Signal Battalion
and that many prisoners were brought in» Among the prisoners
was a Commissar who claimed to be an Intendant of the second

ranic* It was possible to convict him by papers found on his
person and he was shot#
These are a few examples only of many reports which, by their wording,

completely disprove Leeb^s contention that these commissars were killed
in battle, and prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the obvious fact that when
commissars were reported "shot", "liquidated", or "taken care of", it was
meant that the commissars had been executed after capt\ire pursuant to the
clear language of the Commissar Order#

2,

Von Kuechler

The defendant von Kuechler's course of e^qslanations with regard to

the Commissar Order began in June 19I46, at vfhich time he signed an affi
davit under oath which was submitted to the International Military Tribunal
in connection Yfith the indictment of the General Staff and High Command
as a criminal organization#

In this affidavit, von Kuechler swore

Commissar Order: I never held this order in'ray hands^ whether
it ever reached my agency, I do not know; whether and in what
manner troop commanders were informed of it, I cannot state#

1.^ then commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Leeb, I met
several times on the battlefield#

We never discussed an

order concerning special measures against political corainissars#

Faced with the documentation in the record of this case, there has
been a prodigious sharpening of von Kuechler*s recollection.

On the vdt-

ness stand here he clearly remembored that he received the Order direct

from OKH, that he found the Order repugnant, that he knew the Army Group
Commanders shared his views, that he immediately discussed the Order with
von Leeb "whom I met more frequently in those days", that he caused his

Chief of Staff to lodge a protest with the Chief of Staff of the Army

1. NOKW-1580, Fros# Exh, 670, Bk XXD, p# 321.
2,

Tr. pp. 2923^h»
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Group, and that he passed it down to his subordinate commanders at a
"tacticaX conference which had alreac^y been called at Tilsit in East
Prussia"

Kuechler's defenses are, in general, the same as those of leeb*

He

testified that, at the conference with his subordinate commanders, he

"expressed repudiation" of the Crder and advanced the opinion that it would
2

be detrimental to discipline^

that he never learned that any commissars
o

were being shot pursuant to the Crder^ that his Ic Officer (Jessel) never
showed him s.ny of the reports concerning the shootings of commissarsj and

that probably the commissars reported shot were in fact killed in action^
'He adopted Leeb^s argument that the low nuiiber of commissars reported shot
shows on its face that the Order v/as not carried out.

In fact, his testi—

mopy follows Leeb faithfully from inconsistency to inconsistency.

Kuechler admits that he passed the Order dov/n to his subordinate

commandersi he claims that he had no alternative: "Of course I could not,

as it were, embesale the Order. I couldn^t v/ithhold it. I had to make it
known.On cross-examination, he said that he had to pass it down be
cause "I did not want to be endangered of being regarded as a disobedient

commander".'^ But was Kuechler in fact under any pressure to pass it down?
Leeb, according to his testimony, did not pass the Order down to the Fif
tieth Corps or the Hear Area, Kuechler knew that Leeb was opposed to the
Order, and can hardly have feared that leob would take ar^ action to make
him pass it down, or any disciplinary action should he refrain from pass
ing it down. Before the Dff, Dr* Laternsor claimed that many of the Amgr

Group and Amy Commanders-in-Chief "did not pass this Order on to their

troops at all", and that Fieldmarshal Rdnmel burned the Commander Order
"on account of his personal opposition to it" rather than pass on to his
g

subordinates an order which he knew to be unlawful.

But Kuechler did not

1. Tr, pp. 2829-31.
2., "Tr, pp. 2831-32.
3. Tr. p. 2833.-

U. 'Tr, pp. 2833, 3^.
5.

Tr, p. 283U,

6, 'Tr. p. 2831.
7

Tr

p

2922,

el -Gluing argment before the International Military Tribunal, pp. 65,6?.
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want to be a "disobedient coimnander"*

'
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Rather, he preferred to pass down

to his subordinates an order v/hich he Imew to be unlawful and which called
for the commission of murder®

Whatever ccmnients he may have made about

the order to his subordinates were ineffective to prevent its execution

in numerous instances by units under Kucchler*s command®

Kuechler^s re

sponsibility for these murders is as clear as Leeb's®

3.

Hoth

In the cases of Leeb and Kuechler, we have observed the execution of
the Commissar Order on the northern sector of the Russian front®

The de

fendant Hoth 'vvas in the central sector, in command of Panzer Group 3 in
von Bock's Array Group®

He admits that he received the order and that he

passed it davm to his si±)ordinate corps commanders — "The fact that it

was passed on by me is beyond any doubt"®^ Hoth seems to say that he dis
approved cf the Order, but, unlike leeb and Kuechler he does not claim
that he gave any oral expression to his disapproval when passing the Order

down®

2

Instead, he advanced the exbraordinary view that his subordinate

commanders and his troops knew that Hoth would disapprove of such an order

even though ho did not say so, and that therefore they would not carry the-

Order out, even though he had passed the Order down to them without quali•3

fication of any Idnd®
If Hoth really believed that his officers and men would feel them

selves to be at liberty , to disregard the Order; if he actually thought
that the tens of thousands of men in his command would be so sensitive

to telepathy as to detect an objection on Hoth's part which he was care

ful not to voice; if he thought that the stern discipline and the military
traditions of the German Ainiy would have the effect of causing its members

to disobey an explicit command; - if Hoth really believed all those things,
ho needod only to road the constant flow of reports coming into his head

quarters- to become quickly disenchanted. According to these reports, his

troops began killing commissars on June 22 - the first day of the campaign®

1®
2®
3»

Tr. p, 3081,
Tr. p® 3087.
Tr. p. 3086®

That day, the 20th Infantry Division reported to the XXXIX Motorized Corps
that one conimissar was killed^ and followed that up the next day TTith a

similar message^^ On June 30, the 12th Rinzer Division reported that "A
political coiranissar holding the ranlc of Colonel was taken prisoner#

was shot as ordered"#

2

He

This report, like many others, by its language

excluded the standard excuse that the commissars included in these docu

ments were merely killed in battle#

Commissar shooting activity by the

troops of the 20th Panzer Division continued to be brisk throughout the

month of Ju]y»

On the 6th, the Ic officer reported to Panzer Group 3 on

the enemy situation#

Among the things included in this narrative was the

"interrogation of a Soviet Russian Coimnissar and shooting of same"#

On

the 18th, he reported that "Approximately tv/enty cominissars were shot by
the division "within a two-weeks period"#
A good deal has been said in this covirt about how the Commissar Order

gradually bocomo obsolete because of lack of enthusiasm for its enforcement
by the very officers who handed it down in the first place#

allowed to become obsolete within Panzer Group 3#

It was not

On August 8, Hoth's

Intelligence Officer compiled an intelligence bulletin which was sent to

every unit vd.thin the Panzer Group dov/n to battalion level, and which
included the followingj

3

In accordance with new Soviet regulations, all regiments and

divisions, as well as higher staffs, ha-ve now
commissars
(formerly political commissars), while companies, batteries and

troops have political leaders (Politruks) who also fall under
the classification of war commissars.

Individual inquiries

on the part of the troops make it necessary to point out again
that there "will be no change in the treatment of these persons#.

This intelligoncG bulletin was distributed by Hoth*s Chief of Staff# Aside
from the fact that it shows that the troops were being ordered a second

time to kill captured coimnissars - and completely explodes Hoth's elabor
ate theory that the Order was not carried out because he had never lent
his approval to it —it shows conclusively that the troops had been carrying

out the ComiBissar Order#

If these figures of executed commissars were, as

1# mm 22U6> Pros# E3di, 62^ Bk lit, p.'UO,
2# NOKW 22U5^ Pros# Exh# 69, Bk III, p#' 91#

3.

NOM 2239, Pros# Exli# 70, Bk III, p. 93.
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Hoth would have us believe.^ merely figments of some officer's imagination,

and if, in fact, the troops had not boon executing these men after cap
ture, there would have been no "individual inquiries^ on the part of the
•troops".

There certainly v^ould not have been a reply to these inquiries

by the Chief of Staff of Panzer Group 3? instructing the troops to continue
treating commissars as they had been doing in the past, but to accord
members of the

GPU and of the border guards the same treatment as was

given to ordinary soldiers,#

Finally, other records of Hoth's Panzer Group 3 once again demolish
the concocted excuse that the reports of shootings were fabrications and
that the Order was in fact not carried out.

In an activity report by the

Intelligence Officer of Panzer Group 3, vvritten in the fall of 19Ulj the
1

following appears:

The special treatment of political commissars by the Armed
Forces resulted in its becoming known to the Russians and

in the strengthening of their ivill to resist. To prevent
its beir^ knoYm., the special treatment should have been
performed only in camps located far back in the rear. Most
of the captured Red Army men and officers are aware of such
a special treatment, of v/hich they said they had learned from
routine orders and from political comriissars who had escaped#
Ona of the witnesses for the defendant Leeb tried to suggest that

this very natural fear which overttok Russian cornmissars was due to "Russ—
2

ian propaganda"#

But the document quoted above shows conclusively that

the commissars becamo alarmed, not because of propaganda, but because
they soon discovered what fate was in store for them if they were captured#

All along the front, German officers and men were being captured and
interrogated by the Russians, and Russian officers and men were being

captured and interrogated by the Germans; sometimes, as the document
quoted above shows, commissars were captured by the Germans, and then
escaped and rejoined the Red Army# What was it that frightened these
commissars? Was it an ugly rumor that Hitler had issued an order for their
execution, but that all tho Gorman officers and men were opposed to it on
the basis of international law and were "quietly sabotaging" it?

1# mm 190U, Pros# Exh,. 6?,. Bk III, p# 8I|#.
2#

ritii'

Gersdorff, Tr#. p#. 2171»

fi'-ini
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Is that

why, as late as the spring of 19U2, Russian coimnissars "were fighting
for their very lives"

Is that why the commissars often committed sui-

cide, or removed their insignia?

2

Did all these things happen because

commissars were pot being killed? We suggest that common sense and the
evidence in this case furnish the answer^

Smcimaiy

Your honors, here is an order issued by the High CoHuiand of the Genmn

Army which ordered and directed the coriimission of murder on a large scale^
•All the defendants knew this 5 every officer and man in the German Amy

who handled the order knew it too# The defendants passed it down to their

subordinates, ^-nd as a. result many murders were committed by troops under
their command*

The mere i^assing down of this order was a criminal actj the defendant
Raeder was convicted by the International Military Tribunal of having
committed vicar criines largely because he passed the commando order "down

through the cha.in of command"#

Military Tribunal V, in the Hostage case,

convicted Rendulic of passing down the Commissar Order, although there
was no proof in the record in that case that aiy commissars were shot by

the troops of Rendulic*s division#^
Tribunal V also convicted von lyeser in corinection with the Commissar

OrderLeyser coimuanded a Division in the defendant Reinhardt's Corps^
and three reports by leysor's Division shovred that his troops had in fact
shot commissars, pursuant to the Order*

The evidence against the defen

dants here is infinitely more extensive and compelling than the evidence

against Leyser and, needless to say, their responsibility as Army Group,
Army,

Corps commanders was far greater than that of Divisional comman

ders such as Rendulic and von Leyser#
These commanders vfere under an affirmative duty to direct and control

their subordinates in such a manner as to prevent violation of the laws of

war by troops under their command*

The obligation of a commander "to

1* Gersdorff, Tr, p. 2l62#
2, Tr, pp# 216U, 79#
3*

Vol# I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p# 317#

U* United States v# List, et al#, (Gas© Np. ?•), pp» 10509'-10»
0* Idem, pp# 1O02U-20#

control the operations of the members of his command" was discussed at

length and firmly recognised by the Supreme Court in the Yamashita case,^
and, as was held by Military Tribunal V in the Hostage case:

2

Those responsible for such crimes by ordering or authorizing
their commission, or by a failure to take effective steps to
prevent their execution or recurrence, must he held to account
if international law is to be anything more than an ethical,

code, barren of any practical coercive deterrent.
But the defendants are not accused here only of sins of omission,

regardless of how grave an offense their failure to take preventive action,

without more, may be.

These men participated affirmatively in the commission

of these murders by puttir^ the Order into the hands of their subordinates.
These defendants, or members of their staff, took further steps to insure
the exBCution of the Order, by passing down supplementary directives in
connection therewith.

Their guilt for those crimes has been established

beyond any shadow of a doubt, and the crirae for which they bear this guilt
is the criiue of murder,

B,

The "Commando" Order

We turn now to the Commando Order,. The events which preceded its

issuance were various raids carried out between 19 August and 6 October

I9I1.2 by English Commando units on Dieppe, .the island of Sark, and various

installations in Nonvay,^
On 7 October a German radio broadcase announced that "all terror and

sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices who do not act like

soldiers but like bandits, have, in the future, to bo treated as such by
the German troops, and they must be slaughtered ruthlessly in combat

wherever they turn up",^ The next day the defendant Warllmont direct^
the Legal Department of the OIOT, headed by the defendant Lehmann, to draft
a formal order,

Lehmann's assistant, Dr, Huelle, complied with this re-

quest and telephoned the text of a draft back to Warlimont on the same day,
Warlimont then sent it to the office of Foreign Counter-intelligence under

1,

In re Yamashita 66 Sip,, Gt,. 3^0 (19U6),

2,

United States v. List,, et al,, (Case No, ?), p, 10it56,

3,

516-BS, Bros, Exh, lUt, Bk IV, p»..89.

ii.

1266^PS, Pros, Exh, 118,. Bk IV, p, 8,,,

5,

Ibid, p, 9,
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Admiral Ganejris and asked for his coEments*

Canaris immediately objected

to the Legal Departraent draft, root and branch.

It allowed the troops

to determine for themselves whom they should shoot after capture.

Canaris

said that a definite criterion should be laid downj that the German troops
should be restricted in the exercise of this order to commandos who were

either in civilian clothing or in German uniform.^ Had this modification
been adopted, the whole meaning and effect of the order would, of course,
have been altered.

But Canaris suggested an even more radical change.

The Legal Depart

ment draft provided that comiaandos who fell into German hands outside of

combat should be interrogated iimnediately and then handed over to the SD#
Canaris wanted such people to be placed in special confinement after cap

ture-, to be reported to the Foreign Counter-intelligence Office, and to
be. tried by courtSHnartial'.

2

01
Canaris also pointed out
that reprisals

against prisoners of war were absolutely forbidden.

3

Lehmann now says that he and Canaris were working hand-in-glove trying
to mitigate the effect of this criminal order.

It has become fashionable

in this trial for the defendants to hide behind Canaris at every turn.

The evidence shows that Lehmann* s way of ivorking with him was to disagree

with the principal objections which Canaris had raised to the Legal Depart
ment draft,- Lehmann argued that Section 23c of the Hague Convention, which

forbids the killing of an enemy who lays down his arms and surrenders, did
not extend to commando troops because "such methods of warfare had not
ij

been thought of at the time this Article was formulated",

Lehmann also

argued that reprisals against prisoners of war were not absolutely prohib

ited but that they depended on reciprocity.

It is also significant that

Lehmann never once objected in the course of this extensive correspondence

to anything except the criticisms and reservations which Canaris had ex

pressed, Aliuost every sentence in the draft which issued from Lehmann's
office on 8 October was siibsequently incorporated into the final order.
With the various opinions before him, t^arlimont elaborated upon

1, •126L|.-PS, Eros, E^th., 119, Bk IV,. p. l3
2,
3,
ii.

Ibid.
^
1265-FS, Eros, Exh., 121, Bk IV, p. 19»
Ibid, p. 20.
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the legal Department draft and sent it to Jodl. Warlimont's version was
followed alMoet paragraph by paragraph in the order v^ich Hitler signed
on 18 October, although it was farther edited by Jodl and Keitel and,
to a certain extent, by Hitler himself. There were six paragraphs in the
final version. The first paragraph was worded by Hitler, but the argument
used there that commando warfare was outside the Geneva Convention origin
ated with Lehmann. The second one was Tnritten entirely by Warlimont and

the third was a joint effort in which Hitler, Keitel and.Jodl supplemented
and extended what Warlimont proposed. The fourth, again, was solely Wariimont's work#

The illegality of the Comra^-ndo Order is clear, and has been estab
lished by the decision of the JM and by the opinion in United States v#V^'ilhalm List, et al.

Lehmann himself said on the stand that he considered

the order to have been an "inadmissable reprisal" to the extent that it

applied to uniformed military personnel^ "Graf Leicester hat nicht immer

so gesprochen". His argument concerning the inapplicability of Section
23g of the Hague Convention was concocted for the specific purpose of
furnishing an excuse for murdering captured soldiers who were in proper
uniform#

After the order had been re-edited for the last time and signed by

Hitler, Warlimont distributed it to the three branches of the Wehrmacht,

which in turn passed it on to the field cormiianders#. As was to be expected,
it was not long before teletype messages reporting the murders of captured

commandos began to pass over Warlinont's desk#. He helped formuilate the

answers i^lch had to be made to the protests sibsequently filed by the
British#

Warlimont began to occupy himself with such matters less than

a month after the order had been issued, and continued to busy himself
with correspondence concerning the execution of the Comniando Order until

at least July 19lj-l4#^ After the Allied landing in France, Rundstedt, the
Commander—in-Ohief V'/'est, requested instructions as to how the Coimnando

Order should be applied# yiTarlimont answered him by saying that it "remains
basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the Vilest#" • A few

days later, a foamial order to this effect was drafted by Warlimont*s

Quartermaster Staff and initialed by him, after niiich it was signed by

.

Keitel arxi passed on to the field ccimnanders#

The line taken by those defendants who were field commanders is

that the order^ even if it was passed on to them, had no application in
the East.

Hoth, for example^ made the sardonic observation that he was

fighting in the steppes south of Stalingrad when he heard the German
radio announcement of 7 October and that he did not anticipate seeing

any British Commando troops there*

Roques, whose sense of humor did not

ilse to this pitch, owlishly stated that for his part he did not consider
the Commando Order to be applicable because it referred only to Europe arsd

iLfrica, whereas he was in Asia at the time he received it«^
To a certain extent, we agree that the order did not have the same
effect in Russia that it had in the West,

The reason that it did not

bring about a radical innovation in the treatment of captured prisoners
of war in Russia is that long before it was issued the German troops had

been shooting captured paratroopers and members of sabotage units#

These

classes of troops are included regularly on the SD lists of liquidated

persons#

2

This was done by virtue of other orders which had been issued
3

from the outset of the Russian campaxgn#

But the evidence shows that it is certainly not correct to say that

the order was only of academic interest to field commanders in the East#

For example, an entry in the War Diaicy of Relnhardt*s Third Panzer licmy
for 18 November 19h2 — exactly one month after the Commando Order was
issued —

reads

Various difficulties have arisen concerning the execution
of the Fuehrer order of 21 October relative to the shooting

of terrorists and groups of bandits.

The Panzer Army asks

the Army Group to clarify above all, whether this order meroOy
concerns British terror groups or whether it also applies'to
the other bands in the occupied area# In this connection, the
Ariiiy takes the attitude that, until a new OKW decree is

published, which is in prospect, all bandits are to be shot
to dea.th even if they wear uniforms#

The order issued by the Third Panzer iirmy the next day provided:^
1. "Tr. p# 53?0.

,H

2# NOM 27U7, Pr'os. Exh. 7^2, Bk IX, p.
3# mm 2626, Pros# Exh# 2)49, Bk VI-iiB, p# -39#

U. mm 3U82, Pros, Exh. 1|6, Rebuttal Bk II, p#.i;3»
5.

NOKW 27U6, pros. Exh. 7U8, Bk IXr-I^ p# 29#

Until new regulations of OKW are published, bandits who
surrender voluntarily without being forced by circumstances,

v>rill be treated as prisoners of war© All other bandits,
including the uniformed ones, will be shot*

Similarly, on 29 October, the Chief of Staff of Salmuth*s Second iirmy

asked the iumy Group to "clarify", in connection with the Commando Order,
whether the German troops were required to massacre all deserters from

partisan units who surrendered.

These examples are sufficient to show the

participation of the defendants in carrying out this order and, incident
ally to es^jlode the contention that it had no relation to the war in
Russia.

We have thus gone further in our proof than we needed to go. It
was not necessary to show that the Comiiiando Order was carried out in order
to show the commission of a crime.

The mere transmittal of such an order

to subordinate units is sufficient, as was held in the cases of Raeder
and Rendulic, mentioned above in connection with the Commissar Order.
/

This was done by the defendants Kuechler, Reinhardt, Salmuth and Reinecke.
They are all guiltier than was Doenita, who was convicted by the IMT be
cause he "permitted the order to remain in full force when he became

Commander-in^hief, and to that extent he is responsible".^ Warlimont
and Lehmann, of course, as the draftsmen of the Commando Order, are crim
inally responsible for all the murders committed thereunder, whether in
the East or in the West.

0.

Other Crimes Against Prisoners of War

paragraphs $0 to 57 of Count Two of the indictment charge all the

defendants except Schniewind v/ith other crimes against prisoners of war.

An abundance of evidence has been introduced in support of these charges.
It will be sumr.io.ri2;ed with respect to each individual defendant in our

briefs, and we will limit ourselves here to a very few brief observations.
The defendants have relied heavily on the circumstance that the

Soviet Union was not a party to the Geneva Convention with respect to the
treatment of prisoners of war, but it is well settled — and was so

i« Voi. i. Trial of the I'fejor War Criminals, p. 31ii.

' 'ii
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held by the IMT — that the general principles of international law with

respect to the treatment of prisoners of yfex were applicable as between
Germany and the Soviet Union# The German High Command was fully a,ware of
this, and Admiral Canaris of the OM set forth this viewpoint in a memor
andum of 15 September 19Ul protesting against proposed regulations for

the treatment of Soviet prisonerso^ Under these well—established principles,
war captivity is not a "punishment" and prisoners of war are not fit ob
jects for revenge or reprisals® They must not be siibjected to dangerous

employment, nor required to work against the interests of their own country
by being forced to engage in any type of labor directly related to war
operations®

There are mary documents in evidence showing that,Russian prisoners
of war were regularly employed to clear mines® The reason given in one
of the orders which required this was that the use of prisoners of war for
2

this purpose was "to spare German blood"®

Another ingenious practice

which was engaged in was billeting prisoners of war in buildings which the
Germans were to occupy if it was suspected that they might contain mines

or bobby-traps®^
Another regular occupation of these prisoners of war was to engage
h

in the loading and unloading and transportation of munitions.®

Prom

time to time, as could be expected thdse prisoners of war were killed

while so employed®^ But the object of the order which committed them
to this work was carried out:

German blood was spared®

The most widespread use of prisoners of war was made in the course

of constructing fortifications® There is hardly a field commander in the
dock whose troops did not use prisoners of war to construct trenches,
anti-tank ditches and field positions of various kinds. Salmuth did it
in France juSt as Hoth did it in Russia®

Yathout trying to make this catalogue more complete, we pass on to
a related topic — the general murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of

1. Vol» I, Trial of the i4ajor Yfar Criminals, p® 232

2, NOKVf 1527. Pros.® Exh, I80, Bk V, p® 20; NOKW 2251, Pros,® Exh® 18?,
Bk V, p® £1*

3® NOKyir 2337, Pros.® E3di® 168, Bk V, p. Ult; NOKW 3337., Pros, Exh. 3^,-Robuttal Bk'I, p® U.®

U# NOKSf 2966^ Proa® Exh® 13U6, Bk V, Sipp® b, p® 5.#
5. mm I9UI, Pros.® Exh. 208, Bk V, p. 132#
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It is clear from the reports ajid orders in evidence here that the

German Army followed a consistent policy of shooting all Soviet prisoners
of war who had attempted to escape and had been recaptured.

But it is

well settled under the laws of v/ar that i t is not a criminal offense for

a prisoner of war to attempt to escape and that, if he is recaptured, he
is only to be subjected-to such disciplinaiy measures as. security and the

prevention of further attempts may require.

The execution of a prisoner

of war merely because he has attempted to escape and been recaptured is

strictly prohibited by the laws of war, and is murder#^ And the record
in this case contains a multitude of reports vdiich follow one another in

an endless procession showing that Soviet prisoners of war who had escaped
frcm confinement were shot as soon as they were retaken.
The treatment which Russian prisoners of war habitually received

while in German custody is one of the most appalling parts of this appall

ing case®

In connection with the Commissar Order, we have already men-

V

tioned that the inmates in the prisoner of war cages were screened for

the purpose of removing those of them who fell within the meaning of that
lethal ordinance#

But the screening process went much further# All the

prisoners of war were put into one pf several classifications,.. Into the

first of these throe classifications fell ethnic Germans, Ukranians, and

natives of the three Baltic countries. Into the second fell Asiatics,
Jews and German-speaking Russians# The third category consisted of persons

classified as "politically intolerable and suspicious elements, commissars
and agitators"#

Theoretically, the treatment was to vary according to the classifi
cation#

The first group was earmarked for service as auxiliaries of the

German Amy and, sometimes, even as combat troopsj the third group was

considered as temporary boarders who \(gtq to survive only until firing
squads could be organized# The Jews wore taken care of by the extermin
ation squads of the Einsatzgruppen, and the remainder was scheduled to

be shipped to Germany to work in the armament industry or to operate
anti-aircraft guns#

1#

The general principles governing escaped prisoners of war are set out

in Sections SO to 5h of the Geneva Conventionj^
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These were the eventual fates which the German authorities had in

mind, but before any given prisoner of war could fulfill this destinyhe had to contrive to stay alive long enough for the plans of his captors
to be carried out.

This was no mean feat.

It will never be known how

many millions of Russian prisoners of war died in the Dulags and Stalags
within the jurisdiction of these defendants. The Oberquartiermeister of

Kuechler^s Eighteenth Army said in November 19iil that 100 men were dying
daily within the Aimy area, A little later it was disclosed that all the
inmates of one camp there vrere expected to die within six months at the

outside. At about the same time the Oberquartiermeister of Hoth<s Seven

teenth Army reported that deaths among prisoners of war within his juris
diction were approximately

a day, Rosenberg wrote Keitel in February

19li2 that "the fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a tragedy
of the greatest extent.

Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several

hundred thousands are still fully able to work",

lf?hat we have said about the illegal use of prisoners of war for 3hbor
and about the care and treatment furnished them while they were in German

custody applies primarily to what took place in the operational area while
these prisoners were still under the control of the field commanders. The

story of what happened to those of them who survived long enough to be

shipped to Germany is a history in itself. The food which they received
after they had a.rrived in the Reich was still inadequate to sustain life,

particuleu'ly when these sick and half-starved prisoners were allocated to
work \vhich demanded strenuous physical exertion, liVe have mentioned that

thousands of Russia prisoners of T/eur were drafted to man anti-aircraft
batteries}

the court will remember the testimony of the vfitness Erh?j:*dt

Milch in this connection. Thousands of others were assigned to work in

various a.rmamGnt plants in Germany, These included not only Russians,
but French prisoners of war and Italiej:i military internees as well, A

description of the conditions under vdiich some of these men were kept can
be found in the judgiiient of Tribunal III in the Krupp case.

The man most

responsible for the plight of prisoners of war in Germany was the defendant

1, United States v, Alfrled ICrupp,. et al,, (Case No, 10) pp, 6l-^8j

' ' ^

Reinecke. In almost every wax crimes case where the question of the
starvaTion^ln^treatment and illegal use of prisoners of war has been an
issue, Roinecke^s name has played a prominent part. The number of victims

of the system "fThich he established and administered is incalculable, a
*'

^

^

vrt -f-he very outset

has already been shown, he knew fully and precisely £^om

the extent to which he was disregarding international law. His guilt i
enormous,

In general, there are three excuses offered by the defendants

having allowed this calamity to take place. The first is that the reports
are either exaggerated or false.

, ^

It is enough to say m

rpnlv to this that

the gruesome uniformity vftiich is to be found in every document relating to
the physical condition of Russian prisoners of war, no matter what t e
source or authorship of the document, eiteludes the possibility of either
falsehood or exaggeration.

The second defense is that the condition of these prisoners of war
Was partly sell-inflicted. The argument goes this way: the Germans SU3>rounded large groups of Russian soldiers during the early months of the
campaign. If these Russians had been reasonable, they would have surrend
ered as quickly as they found that they were cut off. Instead, they obstin
ately perservered in resisting until their food, water and ammunition sup

plies were exhausted. Therefore, they were in a somewhat debilitated con
dition when they first came into German hands. It follows that the Germans
are not to bo blamed if they died by the millions later on.

Apart from the fact that this argument is inconsistent with the con
tention that the reports are either fictitious or inaccurate, it is ridic
ulous' to say that because a man is hungry and ragged, when he becomes your

prisoner of war you have the right to allow him to die of malnutrition or
to freeze to death. V/e know of no requirement in international law or aiy-

where else that soldiers, upon surrendering, must bring along their own
housing and cooking facilities.
The third and last defense consists of a kind of shell game in "vnhich

the pea represents responsibility for •fche care and treatment of prisoners
of war.

Leeb, the Amy Group Comnander, wants to say that this lay entirely

with his Amy Comioanders and -with the commander of the Rear Area of the
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Army Groups The kmy commanders want to say that the responsibility fell

on the commandant of prisoners of war^ although Hoth testified candidly

that his Oberquartieimeister dealt with prisoner of war affairs and that
he, as coimnander of an Arny, was responsible for taking care of the prison
ers of war in his area, the documents show conclusively that, within the

operational area, the /vrmy Groups and /umiies exercised complete control
over prisoner of war affairs.

D. Deportation and Enslavement

Paragraphs 6U to 68 of Count Three of the indictment charge the defen
dants with war crimes and crimes against humanity against the populations

of occupied countries, including the deportation of the inhabitants to
forced la.bor in the Reich, the forced labor of the inhabitants on field
fortifications and for mine clear^ce, the plunder of private and public

property, and wanton destruction and devastation. We shall leave most of
these matters to presentation in our briefs, and will deal here only with
the responsibility of the defendants for the deportation of millions of
civilians to forced labor in Germany.

TiVtien Germany commenced to reach the bottom of her manpower barrel,
the scheme was initiated to make wholesale transfers of workers from

occupied territory to the Reich for use in the armaments and munitions
industries. This overall plan was implemented in various ways. At first,

drives were put on to encourage foreign workers to volunteer for labor
service in Germany. The response to this was so feeble that machinery was
set in motion to substitute force for persuasion.

In the Yfest, the "Sauckel

Action" v/as instituted in the spring of 19U2. The result of this was, as
1

Tribunal III stated in the Kfupp case}

Wholesale manhunts were conducted and able-bodied men were

shipped to Gerioany as "convicts" Tdthout having been charged
or convicted of any offense. Jiany were confined in penal

camps for three months during which time they were required
to work for industrial plants.

If their conduct met with

approval they were graduated to the status of so—called
"free" labor.

This was a misnomer as they were detained

under compulsion.

1. tfeited States v. Alfried Krupp, et al», (Case No. 10) Tr, p. 90
..67-.

The record shows that the defendant Sperrle, who was ConiiTiander of

all German Air Force Units in the West and also served as Commander-ih-

Ghief West during Rundstedt's absence, cooperated with the agencies of
Sauckel's labor Mobilization program. Sauckel himself told Milch at a

meeting of the Central Planning Board that Sperrle had been most obliging
in this respect.

On another occasion, Sperrle sent a basic order vifliich

directed that Gorman agencies in Northern France and Belgium were not to
recruit laborers on their own initiative, as this practice interfered with
the Sauckel Action#

A different procedure was used for impressing and deporting civilian

workers in the East. There the agency which was primarily charged with
the task of obtaining the labor which Genaany needed was the Economic Staff
East, which operated as part of Goering*s Four Tear Plan.

The defendants

attempt to disclaim all responsibility for what was done by this organi
zation# But this disclaimer is contrary to the evidence of what actually
happened.

An Economic Inspector was with each Army Group staff. Attached

to the staff of each army was an Economic Leader,

Economic offices which

belong to the organization were also to be found with the Arngr Group Rear

Area, the Security Divisions and the Feldkommandanturent, In other words,every agency of the German Ground Forces from the Amy Group Area to the
front line troops was riddled with representatives of Economic Staff East.^

As an example of the part which the Army played in the implementing

and execution of the slave labor prj^graa,^ a- briaf marrative of the evi
dence relating to the defendant Reinhardt will be illuminating.

On the

witness stand, he testified that the first time he or the staff of his 3rd

Panzer Army were involetad. ^ -y-Lg drafting of workers to be shipped to

Germany, was in July 19ii3. The downright untruth of this statement cannot
be demonstrated better than by the contents of two documents, both issued
in November

The first is an order which was signed by Reinhardt

himself in which he announced thati^
The Fuehrer has charged Gauleiter Sauckel with the direction
of the entire labor allocation program reaching into the

zone of operations# An intelligent cooperation of the military

1. NOpr 3^39, Rebuttal Exh, 39,- Rebuttal Bk II, p.l?#
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agencies with the departments of the labor allocation adminis
tration must make It possible to mobilize the work-capacity of
the entire able-bodied population. If success cannot be achieved
in any other way, coercive measures must now be applied to
recruit the required labor for allocation in the Reich»

The report of a Secret Field Police group to the 3rd Panzer iirmy three

weeks later stated the following:^
Jefim Charitonow,,,»with his three Juvenile children, made

his v/ay to the partisans, although the children objected;
he was arrested on his way#

<

He was shot on October 22# The three children were sent to
Germany to work#

An order issued by the headquarters of one of Reinhardt*s subordinate
Corps on 2 June 19U3 contains the following:

2

The drafted labor forces will attempt to dodge the labor

allocation with every means at their disposal#,•#ii.ll
men and women are to be instructed that they will be shot

at ar^ attempt to flee,,,••The labor camps with the
divisions must be surrounded by barbed wire and remain
under constant supervision#

In July 19U3, Reinhardt drafted and published a proclamation to the
3

inhabitants of the territory occupied by his troops, which provided:

All persons of the age group 192^ have to serve their com-^
pulsory labor term in the Reich Territory, with the exception
of those who are employed as voluntary helpers, with indigenous
units, or with the indigenous police service#
^

rc ^

^

^

moever tries to evade his service obligation will be severely

punished. The seme also applies to perso^ who by harbori^

amrone liable to service or in any way help hxm (her) i-n
attempts to evade the service obligations or strengthen
in his intent to evade his duty# Moreover, in place of™
person liable for service who has not appeared, his next of

kin may be drafted for labor allocation in the Reich, regard
less of the personal circumstances#

On July 23rd, the minutes of a meeting held at the headquarters of
the 3rd Panzer /ixmy noted that one reason for the difficulty in appre
hending inhabitants for labor commitment was the large quota which had

NOW 686, Eros. Exh, 719, Bk IX-G, p# 26#
NOW 2100, Eros, Exh# hlli Bk VII-Ai p# 152#
3. NOW 23UO, Pros# Exh# U8U, Bk VXI-A, p# 191#
1#

2.,
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the Reich". One cure which was proposed for attemptecl evasion of service

in Germany was that members of the fanilies of persons who had escaped were
to be apprehended "regardless of personal situation" and substituted for
the escapees» 1

On 26 Ju3y the 3rd Panzer knay niade a report to

center,

concerning the recruitment of Eastern worlffirs. The introductory sentence
reads: "The population rejects labor allocation in the Reich", One of
the measures suggested to overcome this resistance was the following:^
Persons apprehended by force after attempts to evade this
draft at first will be sent to penal camps which must be
run along strict lines.

It was al^o mentioned that the age group 1926 had to be drafted as well
as the members of the 1923 class*

This is an appropriate place to mention the testimony of one of

Reinhardt>3 witnesses, who said that Reinhardt demonstrated his objection
to these orders. He was asked how he demonstrated it. jhe answer was:-

by assuring the population that only members of the I925 age group were
affected, and that the rest of the populo.tion need not be apprehensive

about this program. Apparently the witness had reference to the proclsjnatlon which was mentioned a moment ago.

The value of Reinhardt's reassur

ance as a soothing syrup must have been somewhat diminished when he added,
within less than a month, still another age group to the list. The docu
ments show that the quota of a thousand workers a week, which had been

assigned to the 3rd Panzer iirmy, was being met by the middle of August,^
Reinhardtts iirmy Group Headquartoirs continued to issue orders nro-

vidlng for the shipment of workers to Germany, One such order, involving

approximately 100,000 persons,, is dated Ifevember 19i|iia^ Reinhardt*s
principal defense on this issue ahnost takes us into the realm of meta

physics, He and his witnesses adinit that a ccmpulsory labor service

program was instituted by the Arriiy, but they say that no force was used, ^
1. NOKW 2^73^ Pros. Exh, l+S?, Bk VII-A, p, 222
2. NOKVT 2k^ks Pros. jSxh, 1489, Bk VII-A• p, 226,
3.

Tr, p, 383ii« . .

it, mm 2570, Pros. ,Exh, lt92, Bk VII-A, p* .235*-

5, , WOKW 2931j Pros. Exh, 1279, Bk VII-Supp. p, 26, —70—
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How such a program could be compulsory v/ithout the use of force is indeed

difficult to understand.

Perhaps, the misunderstanding lies in the meaning

of the word force# We associate shootings, severe punishments and baibed
wire enclosures with force,

E,

Apparentlly Reinhardt does not,

Murder and Ill-treatmenb of Civilian

Populations:

the Einsatzgruppen

Repression and ill-treatment of the civilian populations of the occu
pied countries was not limited to deportation and enslavement of their

persons and plunder and destruction of their property.

Grave as these

crimes vrere, there were others which were even more savage.

Thousands

upon thousands of civilians were illegally spirited away and imprisoned
or murdered, pursuant to

notorious "Nacht und Nebel'*'decree formulated

b^Yvarlimont fuid lehmann, . A stupid and brutal policy for the suppression of
resirstanC^oy the indiscriminate slaughter of hostages characterized the

German occupation almost everywhere.

But the darkest blot on the record

of the German Arny and of these defendants is their participationJ;:njtJie
slaughter of millions of Jews, gypsies, and political officials in the
Eastern occupied territories.

And wo will conclude our discussion of the

evidence today vdth a brief analysis of the responsibility of these defen
dants for the millions of murders committed by the Einsatzgruppen of the

Security Police and SD — a program of murder which was described by Mili

tary Tribunal II as "beyond the experience of normal man and the range of

manmade phenomena",^
All the defendants have emphatically denied any knowledge of the exbe3>»
mination mission of these units and of criminal acts perpetrated by the SD,

If they learned at all that communists, Jews and other so-called "undesir

ables" were being killed, then the rumors vjhich came to their ears concerned
only events which had happened somewhere far in the rear, in territories
under civil administration. And they were never able to put their fingers

on the sources of these rumors, or to evaluate their credibility. They
never dreamed that the Einsatzgruppen of the SD were in anyway concerned
with such "excesses".

In each and every case, it was the indigenous pop.*?

1, United States v, Ohlendorf, ©t al,, (Case No# 9)* Tr, p, 66U8,
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ulation which spontaneously killed coramunists and Jews#

Bubj at the same time that this strange phenomena was transpiring, all
these defendants, witnesses and affiants who professed complete ignorance
of the ''illegal" activities of the SD units, displayed detailed and accur

ate knowledge of what they called the "legal" tasks of the Einsatzgruppen,

such as security tasks, appraising the political situation, and partici
pating in anti-partisan combat. That these security tasks embraced the
extermination of those races and classes which might endanger or onHy
inconvenience the future of Hitler's thousand-year Reich, escaped their
attention somehow.

The laws and customs of war provide for military authority over the

territory ox the hostile state,^ Territories are considered occupied
according to those laws when It is actually placed under the authority
of the hostilo army. The occupation extends only to the territory where

such authority has been established and can be esrercised.

2

'

•X

The milib^.ry

3

authority is obligated to ensure public order and safety and to respect
family honor and rights and the lives of persons.

Tribunal V in the

"Hostage" case has given full recognition to this principlet

The commanding general of occupied territory having

executive authority as well as military ccmmand, will not
be hoard to say that a unit talcing unlawful orders from
someone other than himself, v/as responsible for the crime^
o.nd that he is thereby absolved from responsibility. It is

here claimed, for example, that certain SS units under the

direct command of Heinrich Himmlcr committed certain of the

atrocities herein charged without the knowledge, cor^enb or

approval of these defendants. But this cannot be a defense
for the comiiianding general of occupied territory. The duly
and respor^ibility for maintaining peace and order, and the
prevention of crime rests upon the commanding general. He
cannot ignore obvious facts and plead ignorance as a defense.

As holders of executive power and coimaianders in their areas, the
defendants were the highest authorities.

Thus they bear full responsibilily

for all criminal acts against civilians which were carried out by aryone
for the time v/hen they were in coimnand of these areas.
the witness Ohlendorf is noteworthy,

The testiiiiony of

Chlendorf was condemned to death

1, Section 3, Annex to Hague Convention of l6 October l^OTji Art* U2-^6,
2,

Ibid, Art; 1^2,

3, Section 3^ Annex to Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, Art, u3.

Ibid, Art, ils*

'

•

5, United States v, VaOhelra Ust, et al,, (Case No, ?) Tr, pp. 10U55-56,
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in this very building, but the Tribunal ^mich found him guilty of mass-

murder paid high praise to his truthfulness.^ Yiihen asked if the liquid
ation of Jews, corrjiuiinists and other "undesirables" was carried out with
the authorization of the limy authorities, ChlendGrf statedi
I believe that the very fact that the l,Vehrmacht itself issued

requests and directives for these executions and gave their
support for the carrying out of these executions are
suffioient proof for their consent without having to add
one other word. Such demands were repeatedly made with
respect to mentally insane, but these could be rejected by luo
because the instructions issued to me made it possible for me
to reject the requests of the Wehrmacht. However, with respect
to the demands of liquidating Jev^s in Simfercpel at the begin

ning of Seotember l^iil, I had to comply with ihe instruction
because I had no argument to counter it.

In order to carry

out this liquidation which transcended our possibilities, the
Amy afforded to us all "necessities in factual and practical
respects. For the rest, the Army knew about liquidation of
Jews earlier than I did myself, since at the beginning of
the Russian commitment I, myself, had been eliminated from
Work with the /irmy for at least four weeks and the Anny
commanded the Binsatzkommandos directly while I vras left
in Roumania. According to limy instructions, these Binsatz

kommandos reported directly to the lirmy about the liquidation
of Jews such as took place, for instance, in Czernowitz. I

myself didn't even get a copy of these reports.
In view of the authority exercised and responsibilities borne by

these defendants, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to establish

that "they had actual knowledge of the Einsatzgruppen. As Tribunal V held

in the "Hostage" case,^ "An yjntiy comander T/ill not....ordinarily be per
mitted to deny knowledge of happenings within the area of his coiimand

while he is"present therein". But the contention that the activities of
these gangs of murderers who were fed and housed by the limy and would
have been helpless without the iirmy support, were unknown to the iomy
commanders, and that these killings of millions took place without thoir
knowledge, is a palpable

grotesque fabrication. As the defendant leeb

himself testlfiedj^ "Every military cor.i2TiandQr at the front is highly
interested ihat in his battle area, and in the rear of his battle area,

peace and quiet and law and order prevails among the civilian popuj^tion".
The defense witness Haider was "firmly convinced" that the slaughter of
Jews "certainly provoked indignation among parts of the Russian civilian

1. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al,, (Case No. 9) Tr, p, 6787.

2. United States v. List, et ai,, (Case No* 7), tr. p. loWl.'
3.

Tr, p. 2361^,
-73-

>1

. .

.

population"^ and agreed that "it would not be unreasonable for a Coinmanderin-Chief to take the position that the activities of the Einsatzgruppen

in executing substantial parts of the population was a threat to his

security and to his operations".

The defendant von Roques testified

that it vras his duty as Comniander of the Army Group Rear Area to safe

guard the lines of communication and supply, and to insure military
security in his area.

2

That is why security divisions were stationed

in the rear area to patrol the roads and railways, and why the Feldkoramandanturas and Ortskommandanturas were established in the towns and

villages.

As the record abundantly shows, the area behind the front line

was not a desert where one could wander to and fro unchallenged, but rather

a veritable maze of rear headquarters, conimand posts, prisoner of war
stockades, airfields, ammunition and gasoline dumps and supply depots,

hospitals, motor pools, and security and communication units that made it

possible for tho front line troops to engage in conibat.

That is why the

array carried on counter-intelligence activities in the occupied area, and
why intelligence reports were regularly submitted to the headquarters of
these defendants telling them what was going on behind the lines.

The

Secret Field Police, the security divisioi^, and many other units were in
constant and close touch with the civilian population. Men, women, and
children can not be wrenched from their hcmes and snatched off the streets

by the hundreds of thousands and led away to slaughter and burial in a

common grave, without the knowledge of their relatives, friends, and
neighbors, or without lamentation, outcries, and bitter protests. The
bare suggestion that the Einsatzgruppen. flitted through Russia, murdering

Jews and other "undesirables" by the millions, but secretly and uribelcnownst
%

to the Army, is utterly preposterous.the desperate sparring of men
who have no recourse but to say what is not true.
This evidence is compelling as to all the defendants and it is almost

a work of supererogation to press the question further. But the defendants
did not have to depend for their information on what they could so plainly
see and hear going on about them.

1,

Let us briefly examine scsne of the

Haldeh, Tr, p, 2107,

2, Tr, pp, l?li24Ut,
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clocumentica^y evidence with respect to three of the defendants —— leeb^.Roques, and IToehler#-

1.. Von Leeb

The order concerning the employment of the Einsatzgruppen in the

operational area was distributed to Leeb's headquarters on 28 April 19Ul»
On 8 June came the Coimnissar Order directing the execution of civilian

comraissars and coimiiissars attached to the troops#^ This order expressly .
stated that coimnissars arrested in the Rear Area of" the Army Group "on
account of doubtful behavior" were to be handed ever to the Einsatzgruppe

or Einsatakoiranandos of the Security Police and SD» On 2h July the first
of two criminal orders on segregation of prisoners of wab and civilians in

.camps and the execution of "politically untenable and suspicious elements:
commissars and agitators" found among them ms issued to Leeb's headquartr

ers#^ It also provided that "suspicious civilians" in the iirray Group Rear

/jrea would be turned over to the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of

the Security Police and SD* The order of 7 October 19^1, received by Leeb«
headquarters, altered the segregation procedure by providing that it was
henceforth to be done in the Rear iirea of the Army Group by Bonderkonmiandoi

of the Security Police and SD rather than by army unitsi I quote from its'
In agreement with the commanding officers of the Rear Ariiy

Group iirea (district commanders for prisoners of war)^ the

operations of the Sonderkommandos have to be regulated in
such a way that the segregation is effected as unobtrusively
as possible and that the liquidations are carried out Tdthout
dolav and at such a distance from transient camps and^villages
as to insure their not becoming loiown to the other prisoners
of war and to the population#

One need not be a Field Marshal to understand these orders. Any

wemi-llterato person .fto received a^r one of ttiese three orders would very
well know that the Einsatzgruppen were murder squads. I^eb's headquarters
received all of them.-- Leeb does not deny this. He merely says that he
does not recall reading them or doing anything about them.. Far from being
leeb's salvation, it is his condemnation.

1* WM 1706, Rros. Exh,. $7,"Bk III, p#

NOKff 2U23, Pros# Exh». 2U]4, Bk VI-AB,

fi#- NO-3l422j, Pros# Exh». 367, Bk VI-©!, p« 21b»i
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V

A tabulation of the number of executions by Einsatzgruppe

attached

to Leeb^s Array Group, shows that, from the beginning of the Russian cam

paign to 1^ October 1914-1^ 135,567^^rsons
thousand of whamv/were Je'wa#

a few

The vast majority .of these murders took place

in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which were within the operational area
of iirmy Group North during part or all of lihe aforementioned period* Es
tonia, where l,l58 were killed, was always within the operational area
of Array Group North, as shown by the operational maps in evidence. The
Reichs Commissariat was established in Estonia on 5 December 19Ul, hut
leeb conceded that the Comi'iiander of idie Rear- Area of Army Group North still

had military functions and powers after that date*
Leeb tried to shift substantially all of the murders by Einsatzgruppe
A into the area of the Reichs Commissariat Ostland,

He testified that

Einsatzgruppe A had no connection to the VTehrmachti that its crimes were

never reported to the Wehrmacht and that they occurred hundreds of kilo
meters away from the front.

All of this is clearly refuted by the report of Stahlecker, Commander
of Einsatzgruppe A, as'well as numerous other documents.

The murderous

activities began during the first days of the campaign in active and close
collaboration v;ith Leeb's immediate subordinates.

Stahlecker saidi"

Einsatzgruppe 'A' after preparing their vehicles for action
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23
June 19Ulj the second day of the campaign in the East,

AriiQ'' Group North consisting of the l6th and l8th Armies and
Panzer Group U had left the day before. Our task was to
hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders

n. • '

of the Armies and with the cah^.iander of the am^ of the

rear area (Army Group Rear Area).

It must be stressed from

the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was
generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer

Group i; under Gen. Hoeppnef, it was very close, almost
cordial. Misunderstandings "v^ich cropped up with some
authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly

through personal discussions,,,,At the start of the Eastern
Campaign it became obvious with regard to the Security
Police that its special work had to be done not only in

the rear areas, as was provided for in the original agreements,
with the High Command of the Army, but also in the combat areas,

1, L-180, Pros, Exh, 956, Bk IX-P, p# U8#
2,

Tr, pp, 25lU-l5»

3, Pros, Ex, 956, L-I80, Doc, Bk 9 P, page 20,
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The Stahlecker report describes further the horrible massacre at

Kowno which was captured by the l6th Army a few days a|ter the campaign
opened

1

During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26»6 the

Lithouanian partisans did avfay with more than 1500 Jews,,
set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other
means and burned down a Jev/ish dTfelling district consist^

ing of about 60 houses^ During the following nights about
2^300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other
parts of"lithouanian similar actions followed the example
of Ko^vno^ though smaller and also including the Communists
who had been left behind.

Those self«c leans ing actions went smoothly because the Amgr
authorities v;ho had been informed showed understanding for
this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only

the first days after the occupation would offer the opport
unity for carrying out pogroms.
Thus, army authorities under Leeb were informed of the planned massacre
before it even took place.

from 1 to 10 July,

Leeb's own headquarters were located in Kowno

He admits he heard of Icillings in Kowno while his head«*

quarters were still in East Prussia, but denies ar^r killings while his

headquarters were in Kovmo.

2

It appears, however, that the murder and

persecution of Jeww continued during the time Leeb was in Kowno and there

after.
26 June.

The report above speaks of pogroms during the nights following
3

Another Einsatz report dated 11 July 19I4I stated:'

In Kownd a total of 7^800 Jews have been liquidated up to
now, partly through pogroms, partly through shootings by
lithuanian Kommandos. All corpses have been removed.
Further mass shootings are no longer possiblei I summoned,

therefore, a Jevfish coimnittee and explained that up to now v/e
had no reason to interfere with the internal arrangements

betvreen the Lithuajjians and the Jews....

Prisons now are being combed through once more, Jews —
if special reasons prevail - are being arrested and shot.
This will involve executions of a minor nature of 50 to

-

100 persons only. To prevent Jews from returning to
Kowno, an agreement was made with the Higher SS and Police
Leader to the effect that the ORPO draw a cordon around

Kowno not allowing any Jews to enter the town. If necessary,
Jews will be fired upon. All Wehrmacht agencies were in
formed about the directives.

I4

Pros* Exh* 956, Ir-180, Doc. Bk. 9 P>..p« 30.-

2.
3.

Tr^ pi 2513. •
Pros. Ex4 922, NO-293i4., Doc. Bk. 9M, pp. 101-102,
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Leeb was asked what he did in connection with this wanton slaughter

of over 7^500 Jews in an area controlled by his troops. - His reply was

that he told the l6th Array to prevent any further excesses.^ Assuming the
^ruth of this highly doubtful statement^ he caused no investigation to be
made, he had no one brought to justice, he took no effective steps to

avoid its repetition., His troops controlled the city, his subordinates
knew of and supported the atrocities.
Kowno.

They continued while Leeb v/as in

He did nothing. .

Precisely parallel atrocities took place in Riga shortly follov/ing

its capture by the l8th Army about 1 July 19Ul. An Einsatz report dated

7 July 19^1 proves that units of Einsatzgruppe A had entered the city and
instigated a pogrom.

"All syngagues have been destroyed| UOO Jovjs have

already been liquidated." 2

It also pointed out that, as a result of the

alleged shooting of a German soldier by a Jew, "100 Jews were shot on
the very same spot by a Kommando of the Security Police and SD."

was only the beginning.

But this

3

A report of 16 July 19iil stated:'

At Riga, the Einsatakcmmando 2 assorted the entire material^
searched all offices, arrested tho leading Communists as
far as they could be found and, headed by SS-^turmbannfuehrer
Barth, conducted in an exemplary manner all actions started
against the Jevfs# 600 communists and 2,000 Jews are under

arrest at present. . I4OO Jews ivere killed during pogroms in
Riga and, since the arrival of EK 22,300 by the Latvian
auxiliary police and partly by our own men. The prisons
will be emptied completely diiring the next days. Outside
of Riga additional 1,600 Jews vrare liquidated by the EK
2 T.yithin Latvia. .

A report of 6 July I9UI establishes the murder of 526 persons by
units of Einsatzgruppe A in Garsden, Itrottingen, and Polangen.

"During

the three large-scale actions mainly Jews were liquidated. Among tho
number of executed, however, there were also Bolshevist officials and

snipers, some of which had, for this reason, been handed over by the

Wehrmacht to the Security Police.^
Up to 16 July 19itl, a unit of^ Einsatzgruppe Ahad killed l,l50 Jews
in Duenaburg. "The arrested Jewish men arc shot without ceremony and

1.

Tr. .p. 238U. . •

2. Eros. Exh. .958, NO-2935, Doc, Bk. 9P, p. 56.
3. Pros. Exh. 92U, NO.2938, Doc, Bk, 9 0, p, 3,
ii. Pros, Ex, 921, NO-29)40, Doc, Bk, 9 N, p, 96,
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interred in already prepared graves,Between 22 and 25 July 19Ul^
229 persons designated as Communist Jews and Jewish women^ Russians,
Lithuanian Communist functionaries, and a Politruk were murdered by a
2

unit of Einsatzgruppe A in Pagiviai, Kedainie, and MarianpolS;,
The mass murders thus far discussed occurred in Lithuania, Latvia,

and Esthonia between the beginning of the attack on Russia -nd 25 Ju!ly
19Ul» Throughout the whole of this period, the places in which such mass
acres occurred were under Leeb^s jurisdiction in the operational area of

Army Group North — which extended from the border of the Reich to his

front line. The Reichs Commissariat Ostland was first established on 25
3

July 19i4-l and extended to the Duena River#

Most of idle cities where the

massactes took place were at the time located in the Rear Aj:*ea of Army

Group North, while Kowno was, for part of the time (1 to 10 July) leeb's
own headquarters,

Yftien Dorpat and Reval in Esthonia were captured by troops of Army

Group North, "a Kommando of the Security Police was always with the first

army units''#^ The same report showed that up to 25 October 19U1# UTU
Jews and 681+ Communists had been executed in Esthonia,

A report of Ein

satzgruppe A covering its activities up to the end of 19U1 stated that
"Today there are no longer ary Jews in Esthonia,"

6

During the time when these atrocities occurred, Esthonia was part of
7

the operational area of Army Group North,

The cities of Eeval, Dorpat,

Narva, and Pirnau in Esthonia were in the Rear Area of Army Group North
during the month of October 19U1#

8

Martin Sandberger, a defendant in

Case No, 9, was chief of Sonderkoraraando la of Einsatzgruppe A, His con
viction and sentence of death in that case was based upon murders (most of

which are summarized above) committed during 19iil when he was at all times

active within the operational area under Leob's jurisdiction. Of parti9

cuXar interest is the following finding by Tribunal II in that case:
1, Pros, Eidi, 92U, NO-2938,. Doc, Bk 9
P« 3»
2, Pros, Exh, 959, NO-28U9, Doc. Bk 9 P, P- 59.

3, Leeb, Tr. p* 2^16$ also oporational maps of 7 and 20 July iyUl,
Exhm IM8O, N0ICifWl50, and Exh. IU8I, NOKW-3151.
U. Pros, Exh. 956, I.-I80, Doc, Bk. 9 P# P» 20,
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Ibid, p, US,

Pros, Exh, 957, 2273-PS, Doc, BK, 9 .P> P* 5l«

Leeb Tr. p, 25X5.
Leeb Tr, p, 252lj see also the oporational map. Pros.

United States v, Ohlcndorf et al (Case No. 9) P» 6819,
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On September 10, 19U1, Sandberger promulgated a general
order for the internment of Jews which resulted in the

internment of k$0 Jews in a concentration camp in Pleskau,^.
The Jews were later executed.

Pleskau was teeb's headquarters prior to September 19lil until he

resigned in January 19U2. How much greater was the pcwer and responsibility

of Field Marshal Leeb and his commanders of the l6th and l8th ibrmies.
Panzer Grpup k, and the Rear Area of Anjy Group North than that of the
insignificant SS Colonel Sandberger? One might as well liken the "blazing
glory of the noon day sun to the tiny flicker of the fire-fly","

The murderous collaboration between leeb's troops and Einsatzgruppe
k

continued.

The localities mentioned in a series of four reports, covering the
period from the middle of October to the end of November and proving the
murder of approximately 1,300 persons with the active participation of
Ifieb's subordinates, were In the very front area of Army Group North as

shown by the operational maps in evidence.^ it should also be pointed
out that Sonderkommanda la under Sandberger or Einsatzgruppe Aestablished

an office in Pleskau as early as 10 July X9kl^ It was still there on l6
January 19i;2 and during substantially all of that period Leeb had his head
quarters in Pleskau,^
A report of the 28lst Security Division of the Rear Area of Army
Group North dated 1 August 19ij.l states that "200 Communists and Jews from

the district of Rositten were shot in the morning hours by the Latvian SelC-

Defense."

k

The slaughter of Jews at Rositten was repeated four days later;

the same document reports:

5

In the early morning of 5 August several hundred Jews were
shot by the Latvian Self-Defense.

In order to forestall

any misinterpretation the Division has established by
inquiry of the C,G» that this special operation was ordered
and carried out by order of the SD.

1.

Prow. Exh. Ilr90, N0Bfir-3l60, Ex. lU9^,'NOKW-3165, Exh. lU96, N0iasr-3l66,

2.

Pros, Exh. 906, NO-3I4OI, Doc. Bk, 9 N^ p. Ul»

3.

Pros. Exh. 901, NO-3Uo5, Doc, Bk, 9 N, p., 17,

U, Pros. Exh, 962, KOKW-21^0, Doc, Bk^ 9 P, p,-65,
5,

Idem.
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The Divisional Ccmmander presented the facts of the case
to the officers on the Divisional Staff at an officers

conference and added the grave reminder that every soldier

had to abstain from criticism of^ and comments on these
matters »

The Commander of the 28lst Secmrity Division knew the slau^ter of

Jews was official army policy, and pub these incidents in his report to

higher headquarters, but the Field Marshal who commanded him testified he
didn*t know \ The city of Rosittenj Latvia was in the Rear Area of Army

Group North before and after this mass murder, and units of the 281st

Security Division were stationed there during that time«^
2^

Von Roques

Another example of blissful ignorance is the defendant Roques«

From

2

his headquarters was issued an order which reads:

5») Executive measures against certain parts of the popul
ation (in particular against Jews) are expressly reserved
to the forces of the Senior SS and Police Leader, especial3y in those districts v/hich have alfeady been pacified#

On the 29th and 30th September 19Ul about 31;,000 Jews were slaughtered

by units of Einsatzgruppe C in Kiew^ which was occupied by troops which
were subordinate to Roques*

registered these killings.

His chief of staff visited the unit which

The next day the unprecedented massacre occurred

Nevertheless, Roques denies that he ever heard of the killing of the Jews
in Kiew from his chief of staff or anyone else#

During the month of August 19Ul^ i;U,000 Jews were killed by units of

the Higher S3 and Police Leader,^ This dignitary was the representative
of the Security Police and the SD in Roques* area#^ He usually had his
headquarters in the same locality as the defendant and frequently dined

with him and his officers#'^ But, strangely enough, Roques did not leam
what the tasks of this man were. Twenty-three thousand of those ijii-,000

victims of Roques* dinner—partner, were killed in Kamieniec Podolsk during

three days#^ On 2 September Roques* chief of staff had a conference at
1.

Leeb Tr, p, 2517-18.

3.

Pros, Exh. 951, NOIO/f-2129, Doc, Bk, 9 P, p# !•

2. • Pros, E5di, 1575> N0Klflf-259i;, Tr, p# 5h79#-

ii., Pros^ Exh,.95U, NOKW-2129, Tr, p. 5U91#
5,,^ Pros,, Exh,. 9U3, NO-31U6, Doc, Bk# 9-0, p, 66,
6,. Tr, p, 529U,
7,. Tr. p. 5U71.

8.

Pros, Exh#..9i;0, NO-315I4, Doc, Bk 9 0-, page 52#
. -81-

the headquarters of Army Group South in which the figures "concerning the
settlsment of the Jewish question in Kamieniec Podolsk" were discussedi

1

The Higher SS and Police Leader^ however, was in no way as reluctant
and secretive as Roques wants us to believe® A report of his, a copy

of which v/as forwarded to the defendant, states unequivocally that 1,658
Jews had beon killed in a mopping-up operation®

2

Does it need to bo said

that by a happy coincidence Roques never learned about the contents of
this report?

It should further not be assumed that the Higher SS and

Police Leader having executed UU,000 in August, did not proceed to murder
in September® A report of 19 September 19Ul reveals that 1,303 Jews,

among them 875 Jewesses over twelve years old were executed by units

subordinated to him# The place of the iiir"-3sacre, Berditschew, wqs at that
3

time the headquarters of Roques#

On the 19 September 19^1 the Jewish district of Shitomir was evacu-

ated and all Jeww of the place, 31b^j in number,- were transported by 32
trucks, which had been placed at the disposal of" the Einsatzgruppen by
the Feldkommandantur and the City Administration of Shitomir, outside the
city limits® The 3alU5 Jews were registered and executed® Fifty to sixty
pounds of underwear, clothing etc® were transferred to the Natioml Social

ist People*3 Waifare Organisation. This execution was carried out on the
basis of decisions vftiich vjere made at a joint conference between the re
presentative of the Einsatzkoimnando and the Feldkommandantur.

There it
k

was decided "to liquidate the Jews of Shitomir complete3y and radically"®
Shitomir at that time was located in the Rear Area of Army Group South,

thus the Feldkommandant by whom those killings were approved was subord5

inate to Roquos#'

Roquos* own witness admitted having watched an incident at the veiy

outbreak of tho wsr, when the Jew, of Dobromil were herded together in the
market square by the SD, and the I'krainian militia® This happened in the

Pros, Exh® 938, NOM/-155U, Doc® Bk® 9 0, p® 50®
Pros® Ex® 81, NOIW/-1165, Doc® Bk® 3A, p® 116-7®

Pros® Ex,
Ex, 1U85,
lUfe, WOKi.'-3155»

Pros®
Pros® Ex® 9U5,
9h^, NO-31UO, Doc.
Doc. Bk® 9 0, pages 7979-60®

Roques
Roaues Tr®
Tr® o®
p® 5I|.87,
5Ii87« Pros® Ex,
Ex® IJ482,
II482, NOKW
NOKlif 3152,
3152, Pros# Ex® II489, NOKW-^
3159#
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Immediato vicinity of the defendantts headquarters.

staff were present and observed this incident*.

Officers of Roques*

The witness was under

the impressicn that the defendant suffered a mental shock as a result of
2 •

this experience*

One of the incidental effects must have been amnesia.

as Roques maintains thqt he never learned about the task of the SD^
3*

Woehler

"When approximately 90,000 Jaws - w e r ^ . r > f "Plirsatz •3

gruppe Da Yfoehlor was chief of staff of the 11th Army. In his capacity
as chief of staff, he wielded no executive power, but had cominand author

ity over the menibers of the staff. Those officers collaborated closely
with Einsatzgruppe D»

V

Ohlondorf testified, as a witness for Woehler,. that the orders for

the commitment of Einsatagruppe D and its siibordinate units were issued

by the defendant* WoehlGr<s immediate subordinates, the intelligence and
counter-intelliS^"-'^® officers, had complete knowledge of the extermination
task of the Einsatzgruppen and worked with them every day*

Woehler asked Ohlondorf to turn over to the Army all watches obtained

from "actions" against Jgwh^ and when Ohlondorf complied with this request
and reported that a further shipment of watches from the "drive against
Jews" could be made available to the 11th Army if they were needed, Woehler

answered with an emphatic "yes",^
Woehler^s defense is that he was of the opinion that those watches

were obtained from Jews who had been "resettled"* There is an answer in
the record to the question of what such "rGsettlement"meant* There are

many documents in evidence where a word in connection with the treatment
of Jaws is crossed out and replaced by the word, resettlement. One of 6
these reports bears clear proof what the original word was* It readsj
The - (the original word is crossed out and replaced by the hand
written word resettlement) of the Jews, nuirbering about

2 ^00, was carried out on 1,2, and 3 December. Subsequent
Gxecutions are to be expected since part of the Jewish population fled, is hiding and has to be apprehended first.

1, Tr. p# ByUj-7
2

3
kl
9,
6*

Tr

p, 8927#

pros. Ex* 91U, NO—3359* Doc» Bk, 9 Nj p* 70,
Pros,. EX, 968, NOKW-631, Doc, Bk, 8, p. 96,
Pros, Ex, 1606, NOKW-3238, Tr. p, 60li6-4i7.
Pros, Ex, 891^ NOKW-1628, Doc, Bk, 9 M, p. 68,
•!«83«

Woehler receivod reports -jniiich stated that the indigenous population
was liberated "from the communists and Jews who had remained behind"

that Sonderkommando 11a, a sub—unit of Einsatzgmippe D, was "straigntening

out the Jewish question" in Nikolajew^, and that the "Crimea was free of
Jews"»^
On the 3 July 19hl the defendant issued an order that an Einsatakommandi

of the Security Police should proceed to Belzy,^ This Einsatzkommando
promptly killed the Jewish Council of Eldeers and h$ other Jews there..

It

fijrther directed the Roumanian Police to shoot an unidentified nuiribor of

Jews.?
On 9 July an Einsatzkommando of Einsatzgruppe D reported through the

11th Army:^
On the basis of available wanted lists and newly compiled
records, on the 7th of this month the arrest of Jews and

Coinmunists began.

On the 8th of this month a large-scale

operation was conducted in the course of which it was

possible to catch all the leading Jewish elements with only
a few exceptions. On the following day about 100 Jewish

Communists were shot by the Kommando. Counting also the
executions of Jews carried out by the Rumanian armed forces
and Police, a total of over ^00 Jews were shot in the course

of the 8th and 9th of this month. A detachment was sent to
Hodin to screen that place.

Woehler*s counter intelligence officer received and copied the report.
Woehler himself ordered the Einsatzkommando to remain in Czernovritz.

3,105 Jews and 3h communists were liquidated in this place by the Einsatz7

kommando#

On the h August, 19Ul, Einsatzgruppe D reported to the 11th Array that
68 Jews and a number of Jewish hostages had been shot by Sonderkommando 11a
o

In Kishinjew# Woohlor read this report.

He previously had sent the Son

derkommando to Kishinjew with the order to seize Jews and politically

Pros# Ex# 1607, NOK.TPros, Ex# 1609, NOKfT-

undesirable elements*^ On the same day Woehler received a report that

in Kodyma 9? Jews had been executed by a unit of Einsatzgruppe D«

2

These

Jews had been shot with the approval of the defendant Sahnuth by an exe

cution squad consisting of 12 members of Einsatakommando 10 a and of 2h

soldiers, who bolonged to units subordinated to Salmuth.^ Salmuth in turn
was subordinated to the 11th Arny»

On lU November I9I4.I, the Ortskommandantur of Simferopol reported to
the Rear Area of the 11th Army that "the 10,000 Jews remaining are being

executed by the CD"o^ At that tixie Woehleris headquarters was l5 to 20
miles away from Sir.iferopol.^ The Cberquartiermeister of the nth Army,
Wcehler's direct subordinate, was located in the city itself. Neverthe

less, Woehler wants the Tribunal to believe that he never heard of the
kining of Jews in the area of the nth Army. Einsatzgruppe Dreported
on the 12 December 19Ul from Sinferopol;
Shootings®

'

2,910 more Jews and 19 Communist officials were shot al^or

summary proceedings. Thus the sum total of executions has

risen to

The final answer to this contention of all the defendants was given
7

by a young medical officer, the witness Dr, Fruechte:
For every officer and for every enlisted man it was, at

that tiaiie, a matter of course that every Jew was shot®
This subnect was discussed with almost everjbody "with
whom one talked for more than three minxes. At least

itTas brought up, and I have not talked to ^

said: 'That is completely now to me. I don t Im

who

anything about it. What are you telling me'. It was

a completed fact for everybody.

1. Rebuttal Exh. 113, NOKSV-3557.

2! Pros. EX. 1395, NOKW-3237, Tr. p. 5982,
Pros, Ex.. 883, NOKW-1573, Doc. Bk, 9 M, p. 52.
5I Tr. p. 605U.^
...
.

3. Pros. Ex. 7U1, NOKW-586, Doc. Bk. 9 I, P. 10.

6* Sos^.*E^°^893, WO-2828, Doc. Bk. 9M, P. 70.'
7# Tr# p®. 91l5j 9117•
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CONCLUSION

This concludes our discussion of the evidence under the charges

of the indictment.

Ifeny serious accusations have not "been dealt with'

the "Nacht und Nebel" decree formulated by Warlimonb and Lehmann, the
orders and practices for the execution of hostages which played such a

large part in the '^Hostage" case,^ the plunder of property and the
wanton destruction and devastation of tovms and villeges, the forced
labor of women and children on trenches and fortifications under the

most rigorous conditions of vforkj and the conduct of Leeb and Kuechler

outside Leningrad.

He have endeavored to select naterial for discussion

today with respect to which defenses have been raised which are common
to several or all of the defendants, in the belief that such a selection
would be most helpful to an appraisal of the case as a whole.

In conclusion, we would like to deal briefly with the question of
mitigation.

In some instances, the defendants were acting in accordance

with orders or decrees issued by superior military authorities, and

Control Council Law No. 10, like the London Charter, provides that such

a circumstance "may be considered in mitigation".^ . In the cases of
Keitel and Jodl, the International Military Tribunal was unable to find

any circumstances which could be Considered in mitigation. Are the
principal defendants in this case in any better situation?

In his Opening Statement on behalf of the defendant Leeb, his
counsel declared that these defendants were "unprepared for the means

with which Hitler fought", that they "were not equal to or able to cope

with his demoniac personality", and that "it was too late when they
recognized the true nature of this man". Assuming the truth of those
observations, do they indeed constitute a true measure of the defendant's

Should these oircumstanoes be allowed to mitigatg .KgifiSBalhimy,
for this most terrible of all wars, for the overrunning of harmless
1. United States v. Wilhelm List, at al., (Cagg
2.

Para, 4 (b) of Article II

3.

Opening Statement of Dr. Latemser, p. 5
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neutral nel^hors,-and- for the comtloss deaths of coiranandos, comnissars,

Jev/s, and oti-ior victir.s Vvhose misoreble fate the ovidonce in this case-—
has unfolded?

Again, the defense tells us repeatedly that these men were cr.ught

up in an impossible situation which allowed of no solution v/hatsocverj
as Dr, Laternsor nut it, '*it has been their fr-te to arrive at situations
and in particular to be brouglit into situations by the leadership for

which, oven today, the prosecution cannot suggest an escape that

might

have boon open at tho timo."^ And tho defendant Lecb hiraself, after
testifyin; concerning his conduct with respect to the Commissar drder,
doclared:

2

I have hc.d ample time and opportunity to phink about this ordor
and about what we did at that time under the pressure of responsi

bility and here I must admit I don't knov; cvon today any better
v;ay«....I ror.lly don't know how Vire could do it differently today.

Troro these inon -- these Fioldmarslials and generals — really so onnoshod

that it was impossible for them to avoid crime?
he should observe, at tlio outset, that it is not tho duty of r.

prosecutor in drawing an indictment, or of a Tribunal incbtermining

guilt or innocence, to tell the defendant how ho should have ordered
his life.

The man who has no problems — whoso rr.tcrial wants are

satisfied, v/hose domestic life is contented, and idiose personality is
in harmony with tho ciroumstr.ncos of his environment — such a man is

rarely found in the defendant's dock.

Crimes are most often committed

when men find themselves' in difficult situations, subject to pressures,

temptations and fears,

The oangs of hunger, the lust for wealth ai^

oorrfort, a dark and violent upbringing, tho frustration of emotional

needs, pressures and fears — all these things help us to understand
the criminal and why he became such.

It is not part of the function of

tho prosecution at the bar or the judge on tho bench to explain to the
defendant what turn ho should have taken at each fork in the roc.d in

order to avoid tho tonptatlon or the fear "^Thioh ultimately led him into
crime.

Prima.rily, these are problems for tho psychiatrist and the

1.

Opening Statement of Dr. la.ternsor, p. 21

2.

Tr. p. 2353
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penolosist.

But the^'" do plc.y a rr.rt — p.nd rightly — vjithin the limits

of tliG discretion vested in the judge — when he comes to impose sentdme,
piid for that reason v/e deou i t appropriate to make a fevv-- observations on

this score.

itVhat is the measure of the guilt of those defendo.nts?

In approc.ching this problem, we suggest that thero are at least

three nuostions the answers to v/hich vnil help to guide us toward a
wise solution.

How strong wore tho pressures on the defendants, and

what paths were .open to thorn? Vfnat is their present attitude in retro
spect toward their own conduct? How will the decision as to the measure

of their Shilt affect other ;-ersons la related slteations, and fhr.t effect
will it have on organized hurr.n society?

On the first point, ™ Bust bear in „iad that we are not dealing
here with the ordinary soidior who, in the oonpany of his ooinr.des and
sobjoct to all the pressure of group behaviour and the violent atmosphere
of combat, is ordered by his comjaanding officer to o omit a oriminr.l act.

T!ie.t is the ordinary situation to meet which the doctrine of mitigation
by virtue of superior orders was devised.

Suoh a soldier is not aoous-

tomed to responsibility or the resolution of difficult problems, is
trr.ined to instantaneous and instinctive obedience, has no time for
reflection, and is in imminent and mortal peril if he disobeys, or oven
hesitates, These defondcnts wore not in that situation, "uhoro their

crimes were instigated by orders from above, tho orders oamo in writing
from a distant place, were recoivod by the dofondanbs at a headnuartcrs

of rdiich thoy were in command, and there v/as full opportunity for roflec tion on the course of action to be pursued.

To SCO what paths were open to those ncn, l©t us once again look
at tho Conmissar ordor as an example.

At bottom, leob^s defense comes

doivn to his contention that he could not openly oppose the order becci'se,
had ho done so, his opposition "would have bcccmo knoivn inmedirtoly to
the hi chest quarters and.....in any caso, hitler would have found out

about tliis strong opposition".^ Thoroforo, since ho disapproved tho
order, his only avonuo of oscap© was what he cr.llod "tacit sabotage".

1.

Tr. p. 2351
^
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A momonffi reVlection will show thcxt this is uttor nonsense and a postfnbricatod excuse.

It is perfectly obvious thnt the Commisser Order had to

bo o'pposod
openly'jjor not 3at' •all.
^The order" had
been
announced
at a mooting
... 'u ^ ^ ^
-I ••
..-•_i'-_.Cwith Hitler at which all of the principal ComnKandors-in-Chicf wore present.

A number of pcoplo participatod in drafting it, and copies were dispatched

to ali tho principal headquarters on the Eastern front. Hitler's intention
to issue such an order, and subsequently the existence of tho ordor itself,

immediately bocame kncfvai throughout tho higher circles of the Army. Himmlcr's
SS also had functions to perform in connection v^ith the Commissar Order, and
its existence was knovm throughout tho SS and SD on the Eastern front. Lot
us assumo that Loeb and the'other defendants, vihcn they passed the Order

dov/n, actually did what they now say they did. Let us assume that they

personally passed down firm instructions that the ordor was not to be complied
with, and the information that tho Coinmandor-in-Chief of the Army oJid all
tho Field Commanders-in.Chiof were opposed to the ordor and had diroctod
that it not bo observed. What would have happened?

Tho answer is pcrfootly oloar — the order would not have boon carried _

out by tho troops of tho Gorman Army, and their failure to carry it out would
have soon booomo known to Hitlor and tho OKFf. Hardly a week oould have

passed before tho Einsatzgruppon and tho sorooning teams of tho SD would haie
obsorwod that tho Army was not carrying out tho order, and report their fail
ure to Himmlor. Hardly more time could have elapsed before ordinary military

Channels ef inforH^ticn - intolUscnce reports, visits to Berlin by officers
j.

^-p I'lnnQon officers from OIIH and OIOT ——

on leave from tho front, reports of liaison oiiioors
TT..L1

DTCi'i that the order vms not

would hOvVo mdo it apparent to Hitler an

beir^ oboyod.

tho documents established

Xndcod, in the happier d..y
r.

j_

__^nivn ond was in fact executed,

that the Commissar Order was in fact passe

counsel for tho generals took tho position that the Comissar Order was not

passed down, orwas passed down with directions to disobey it - and. exactly
r^rttorn of conduct constituted

in line with what we arc now saying — th-t this p .
,

"The Commanders-in-Chief of the

open opposition to tho Commissar Order*
I

e +V(T s order on to -their troops at all.

Army Group or Army either did not pass this
I,

•.u.r

4-n Qvrde it.

or thoy ordorod, on their own authority, to ovaae

They did so xn full

cs onsciousncss of^ tho danger thi-.t thov
tnoy might
6^ be heavily punished for open dis

obadionoe in war to an order of the supromo commr.nder."
Closing Statement of Dr. Utornsor before the mT, p. 65
-

''' '

\ m\ " -I TiHi

'

I Iiliriifliaiil

89 -

Ylhen wg say that tho Goramissar Order had to be opposed openly or

not at all, v/o of course refer to the general pattern of conduct of the
Conimanders-in"<Jhlof as a group.

It probably v/ould have been possible for

one or tvvo Individual commanders to secretly disobey the order by merely

throwing it in the vrasto basket and not passing it down to their subor
dinates.

That is what Dr. la-t^rnsor'tolls us that Fieldmarshal Rommel

did with the Commando Order.

That is what the defendant Leeb told us he

did with respect to the Fiftieth Corps and the Army Group Rear Area,
and that is what the defendant Kuechlor told us he could not do with

respect to his subordinate units. This device of secret disobedience might

have furnished a personal solution for a few of the Commanding Generals,
but if adopted by all it would, of course, speedily have attracted
attention and ammoxmted to tho equivalent of open disobedience.

In short, the idea of "tacit sabotage" of a widely-known, highly
controversial order such as tho Conmiissar Order is 3.S apocryphal as the

phoenix or the unicom. That is precisely why the defendants were led
into such a maze of self-contradictions and absurdities in their desperate

efforts to make the unicorn come to life. That is why we hear in one
breath that most commissars coimiiittod suicide or rippsd off their

insignia in fear of what they kn^w would be their fate, and in the
other that tho order was not carried out. That is why we are told one

minute that the reports of executions were concocted to deceive higher

headquarters, and the next minute that the reports prove so small a number
of executions that disobedience to the order must have been the rule.

Secret disobedience, accordingly, was
few and "tacit sabotage" is a myth, "IVhcn

more than a
©ther defendants

received the Commissar Order they could either have swallowed it or

refused to obey it, Tho proof clearly establishes that they swallowed
it, and the defense evidence proves only that • when they swallowed it,
it may have tasted bad. And he who swallows an order such as the
CommtBSax Order must be prepai'od to take the consequences. It is all very
well to talk about the necessity for obedience to orders and the main

tenance of discipline, but when we are concerned with an order such
as the Commissar Ordur which, instead of promoting discipline, undermines it,
- 90 -

an order vAiich the defendants all claim constituted an egregious example of
military stupidity, an oi^er which directs the commission of murder on a

vast scale, and an order ^hich the defendants well knew was a shame and a

blot on the Jirmy to vhich they had devoted their"^yes^ there is but one
conclusion. No man could ^rve his Army or his country by obeying such
an order#

-

Xfc is academic to debate the qxiestion iiAiether, if all the
in-chief had openly declared their unwillingness

obey the CoBimissar Or

der, the result vDuld have been a modification of the order, or their dis
missal and replacement by other generals, it is academic and speculative
to debate whether they would have had a better chance of dianging Hitler<s

mind by a less ostentatious manifestation of disagreement which might bet
ter have en&bled him to save his face, m any event, there is absolutely
no basis to assume that a dignified expression of unwillingness to comply
vdth an order which was not only criminal but stupid would have had no ef
fect on Hitler. Whatever may have been Hitleris other faults, he was not
totally without intelligence, and, at least until the latter stages of the

war, there is no indication that he felt he could get along without gener
als to lead his troops. Throughout the war. Hitler never turned to anyone
but the generals to lead his troops, except in two or three instances out
of hundreds. why was the defendant Leeb himself called back from retire

ment, m 1938 and again in 1939 although, according to his own testimony,
he was in disfavor with Hitler and Himmler because of his religious con
victions and other manifestations of opposition to Nazism? As the defense

witness Haider testified. Hitler was unable and unwilling to replace even
the generals whom he mistrusted "because at least at the beginning, he

did not think that he could forego the expert knowledge of these generals",
and this attitude on Hitleris part continued"approximately until the end
of 19A3- and the beginning of I942", many months after the issuance of the
orders involved in this case.

The defendants have told us that they would have been reluctant to
resigu iu protest against such orders as the Commissar Order, because that
would have involved an abdication of their responsibility towards their
_

__

^

Himmler,Sepp Dietrich and one

o2# Haider,
1A
leaders were given high military commands#
Tr. p, 2026,
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would merely have led to their replacenent by others who v/ould have been

more willijig to conform to Hitleris desires.

Yet, when Hitler began to

interfere seriously in tactical matters at the time Haider mentions, the

generals resigned in droves,

Leeb and Hitler came to a parting of the

ways because of a disagreement on tactical matters and three years later
the same thing occurred between Hitler and Kuechler.

If it was abdica

tion of responsibility towards the troops, and an invitation for re
placement by weaker men, to come to an open break with Hitler over the

Coimaissar Order, or the Barbarossa jurisdiction order, or any of the other
criminal orders, it was equally an abdication to come to a break because

of tactical disagreements. And i^ether or not it was theoretically possi¥

ble to resign one*s command voluntarily, it v/as perfectly easy, as Kuech
ler put it, to "make demands in such a v/ay that a break must occur".^

The records of the German Field Marshals and generals are full of just

such instances where a resignation was accepted, or where Hitler on his

own initiativa relieved a oammander, because of tactical disagreements.

It is perfectly plain, in short, that the German generals thought that
tactical matters were sufficiently vital to warrant forcing matters mth
Hitler to the breaking point, but did not so regard the ordmilnal orders

and policies which are the subject of this proceeding. It is not for the
prosecution to say whether any particular defendant should or should not
iTS-ve resigned, or openly declare his refusal to obey an order such as
the Commissar Order, or adopted some other solution of the problem.
The choice between these several alternatives would, for any individual,
"be governed by his temperament and his estimate of the overall situation

at the time.

But that there were solutions to this problem other than

th3tt which the defendants adopted is perfectly plain.,
To conclude on this point, we must not forget that one can find no

basis

mitigation in a superior order, if there is no evidence that

the defendants* will was affected and coerced by the order. If the de-^

fendants* will coincided with that of the superior who issues the cHminal order, or if, having full opportunity for reflection, and choice, he

jifikes no serious effort to avoid the conimission of crime, there is no
bas is for mit Igation

^Tr. p. 2982.

And when we find the defendants - such as Hoth - actively furthering the

•objectives of these criminal orders by stirring up the troops to hatred
of the Jews, we must conclude that these are circumstances not in mitigation

but in aggravation.

To turn to the second question, have the defendants demonstrated here
an attitude in retrospect toward their own conduct which invites judicial

clemency to find circumstances in mitigation?
jj^rnberg:

There are many hew roofs in

can we see reconstruction tinder way in this court room? Regret-

fully^ such is not visible from where we sit.

The defendants have not hesi

tated to resort to inconsistent and implausible excuses, and have denied

loiowledge of things which must have truly assailed all their seven senses.
The

sleej:^, unobservant or insensitive men. The defen

dant Leeb, for example, is a cultured and highly intelligent person, fully

alive to the moral factors in a situation; to sec this we need look no
further than his correspondence with Brnuchitisch concerning the offensive

jji the west and the violation of the neutrality of the Low Countries, He
distrusted Hitler, and was disgusted with Himmler's policies and — to say
the lo^®^

suspicious of his organization. He knew of the atrocities

Qf the SS lu Poland, Ho heard Hitler in March of 19^4-1 outline a barbaric
and terri^^® program of warfare in Russia, He saw the Commissar Order and
the
J^fsdiction order emerge. He knew that units of Himmler's
qS were coming with his own troops for special political tasks. He says

that he compl * d about these matters to his commander-in-chief and to his
conm^

quarter®

, and his staff must have been aware of this.

'

the

'Orders

His head

the screening of prisoners and the liquidation -

^desirable elements". His headquarters received reports
the

'^dssars. Thousands upon thousands of Jews and others

were
a meh
these

operational area. It is quite incredible that such
- Leeb under all tv,

jnurder

•Xedg'3 fur '

knoT'^

"-nese circumstances would have known nothing about

^rocitieg^

believe -tliat his denial of such

s the basis for mitigation or leniency.
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Finally, we cannot fix our gaze exclusively on the defendants' dock.
The acts of the defendants profoundly affected millions of other men, and
the decision in this case is not to be rendered in a vacuum.

The judicial

process is a social process. . There are others to be considered beside the

defendants, and I do not refer to the millions who lie buried because of
the events related by the record of this case. They, too, have their claim

to make here, but their strongest claim is that these things should not
be repeated.

The doctrine of mitigation by virtue of superior orders is a doctrine
the purpose of which is to protect those whose opportunity for reflection,
non-existent or limited.
choice, and the exercise of responsibili'^yjIn modem military organization, the chain of command runs up from the
ordinary soldier through his officers

military coramander-in-chief and

then to the Supreme Command, which may be lodged in a Chief of State, a

President, a Cabinet, or other civili®'^ agencies. Within this structure,
everyone is subject to orders, even if

^ Fieldmarshal. Obviously,

the doctrine of mitigation by superior orders is not intended to give a
blanket protection to anyone, no matter how highly placed, merely because

he is in the military hierarchy and r esponsible to someone else.

Other

wise, the entire doctrine of individual responsibility v/ould be destroyed,
and the Chief of State himself would be the only one who could no^ claim
mitigation.

That is why, may it please the Tribunal, the prosecution firmly be
lieves that it would be unwise, and unfair to the millions of troops who
served "under these defendants, to gi"""® weight to the doctrine of superior

orders as applied to such defendants as Leeb, Kuechler, Both and others
whose positions were at or near the top of the military hierarchy. Count
less criminal outrages occurred in the sphere of command of these defendants.

Somewhere, there is unmitigated responsibility for thesis atrocities. Ig
it to be borne by the troops? Is it to

borne primarily by the hundreds

of subordinates who played a minor role in this pattern of crime? We think
it is clear that that is not where the deepest responsibility lies. Men

in the mass, particularly when organized and disciplined in armies, must
be expected to yield to prestige, authority, the power of example, and

the threc.t of instp.nt punishment.

The stondo.rds of conduct of

soldiers nrc bound to bo powerfully influenced by the examples set by

their commanders.

That is why we said, in our opening str.tenont that

"the only way in v/hich the behavior of the German troops in the recent
war can bo made comprohonsiblo as the behavior of human beings is by a
full exposure of the criminal doctrines and orders which were pressed

upon thom from above by those defendants and others",

could the

Gciman Army look to, other than Loeb and the senior Fieldir&rshals, to

safeguard its standards of conduct and prevent their disintegration;

If a decision is to bo rendered here vdiich may perhaps help to prevent

the repotition of such events, it is importrjit above all olso that
rosponsibility bo fixed whore it truly belongs.

Mitigation should bo

reserved for those upon whom superior orders aro pressed down, and who

lack the moans to influonco general standards of behavior.

It is not,

wo submit, available to the commander "vdio participates in bringing the
criminal prossuro to bear, and whose rosponsibility it is to ensure the
preservation of honorable military traditions.

-
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